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Abstract
Optimal utilization of natural resources such as water, wind and land over extended
periods of time requires a carefully designed framework coupling decision making
and a mathematical abstraction of the physical system. On one hand, the choice of
the decision-strategy can set limits/bounds on the maximum benefit that can be ex-
tracted from the physical system. On the other hand the mathematical formulation of
the physical system determines the limitations of such strategies when applied to real
physical systems. The nuances of decision making and abstraction of the physical sys-
tem are illustrated with two classical water resource problems: optimal hydropower
reservoir operation and competition for a common pool groundwater source. Reser-
voir operation is modeled as a single agent stochastic optimal control problem where
the operator (agent) negotiates a firm power contract before operations begin and
adjusts the reservoir release during operations. A probabilistic analysis shows that
predictive decision strategies such as stochastic dynamic programming and model pre-
dictive control give better performance than standard deterministic operating rules.
Groundwater competition is modeled as a multi-agent dynamic game where each
farmer (agent) aims to maximize his/her personal benefit. The game analysis shows
that uncooperative competition for the resource reduces economic efficiency somewhat
with respect to the cooperative socially optimum behavior. However, the efficiency
reduction is relatively small compared to what might be expected from incorrect as-
sumptions about uncertain factors such as future energy and crop prices. Spatially
lumped and distributed models of the groundwater system give similar pictures of
the inefficiencies that result from uncooperative behavior. The spatially distributed
model also reveals the important roles of the geometry and density of the pumping
well network. Overall, the game analysis provides useful insight about the factors
that make cooperative groundwater management beneficial in particular situations.
Thesis Supervisor: Dennis B. McLaughlin
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Large-scale structures and systems are built around natural resources like water,
wind, land, fossil fuels and several others to extract benefits for human use. Operat-
ing around such physical systems requires a careful understanding of its underlying
dynamics and the effects of our actions on such systems. However these sytems
are stresses due to increasing demand and standard of living of the growing human
population. Problems arising from these shortages are further aggravated due to in-
creasing seasonal variability in weather patterns and disruptions in the natural cycles
of resources from natural and anthropogenic activities.
Therefore, rather than maximizing the extraction of economic benefit from these
natural resources, the focus of research has shifted towards developing sustainable
and efficient use of these natural resources. As a decision-maker one has to balance
his/her inclination to extract greater benefits at the current time with the possibility
of incurring lower benefits or irreversible losses in the future.
The primary focus of this research is to implement numerical solutions of dynamic
optimization techniques to permit the use of a more realistic physical system. On
one side, we analyze the and compare the performance and implications of different
decision making strategies to a given physical model. And on the other side, we
compare effect of model description on its derived decision behavior. Such an analysis
requires first a mathematical formulation of the physical process and the limits in
the natural system that act as constraints. The second part focuses on building
optimization models that can perform on such complex systems. These optimization
models coupled with optimal control techniques like dynamic programming and game
theory, can help us better understand and quantify resource utilization.
The implementation of the above techniques is illustrated with two water resource
utilization problems: optimal hydropower operation and competition for a groundwa-
ter resource. The reservoir operation is a modeled as a single agent optimal control
problem where it must negotiate an appropriate energy contract that it can reliably
provide and operate the reservoir in real time adapting to uncertainty in the reser-
voir inflow and other environmental constraints. The competition for a groundwater
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resource is modeled as multi-agent optimization problem where each agent aims to
maximize his/ her personal objective. A dynamic game approach is used to analyze
the behavior if such a system. Applying a more realistic description of the physical
system yields results that are qualitatively different from previous solutions obtained
from the simpler abstractions of the physical system.
1.2 Single agent hydropower operation
Revenues from hydropower generation often depend on the operatorAAZs ability to
provide firm power in the presence of uncertain inflows. The primary options avail-
able for optimizing revenue are negotiation of a firm power contract before operations
begin and adjustment of the reservoir release during operations. Optimization of the
contract and release strategy is closely coupled and most appropriately analyzed using
stochastic real-time control. Here we use an ensemble-based approach to stochastic
optimization that provides a convenient way to construct non-parametric revenue
probability distributions to explore the implications of inflow uncertainty. The en-
semble approach makes it possible to readily compare revenue distributions for differ-
ent contract selection-reservoir operations strategies. These distributions and related
spill performance statistics reveal the distinctive risk characteristics of each strat-
egy. They suggest that predictive operating strategies such as stochastic dynamic
programming and model predictive control can give significantly better performance
than standard deterministic operating rules. The performance obtained from batch
optimization with perfect inflow information establishes a convenient upper bound
on potential revenue and provides a baseline for assessing the significance of differ-
ences between real-time operating strategies. Sensitivity analysis indicates that the
benefits of predictive operational strategies are greatest for reservoirs with medium
non-dimensional residence times and less important for reservoirs with large resi-
dence times. These strategies can better accommodate spill penalties than standard
operating rules. Overall, probabilistic analysis of the coupled hydropower contract-
operations problem provides a realistic way to assess revenue and risk for reservoirs
that must provide firm power when inflows are uncertain.
1.3 Multi-agent groundwater common pool manage-
ment: A lumped model approach
The groundwater common pool resource problem is examined with special attention
given to the hydrologic realism of the problem formulation. Groundwater depletion is
considered for an uncooperative open-loop Nash equilibrium, a sub-game perfect feed-
back Nash equilibrium, and a myopic pumping strategy as well as a cooperative social
optimum strategy that establishes a baseline for comparing the economic efficiencies
of the alternatives. System dynamics are described with a two-compartment model
that includes both groundwater recharge and flow to or from a river. This model
provides realistic steady-state solutions for both pumped and unpumped conditions
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and meets the requirements needed to obtain dynamic closed-form discrete-time solu-
tions for all of the selected management strategies. The availability of these solutions
makes it possible to quantify the magnitude of the strategic externality that results
from uncooperative aquifer exploitation as well as the effects of player asymmetry,
the number of players, and hydrologic variability. The formulation can also quantify
the effect of stock limitations for the social optimum and myopic cases. These factors
are all considered in a simple example that captures several key hydrologic features
of interest in practical groundwater depletion problems. Generally speaking, the in-
efficiency and strategic externality due to uncooperative depletion are small relative
to the total revenue, with economic efficiency decreasing progressively from the social
optimum to the myopic strategy. The results show how hydrologic considerations
previously neglected in game theoretic analyses can influence player behavior and the
state of the groundwater resource.
1.4 Multi-agent groundwater common pool manage-
ment: A spatially distributed approach
The common pool resource problem is reexamined with a spatially distributed ground-
water model. System dynamics using such a model can capture the inter-spatial in-
teractions between the players' pumping wells and the boundaries. With suitable
assumptions the groundwater depletion can be reconsidered for a socially optimum,
sub-game perfect/ feedback Nash equilibrium and a myopic pumping strategy. The
economic efficiencies are measured with the socially optimum as the baseline strat-
egy. The strategic externality from non-cooperative behavior is measured for different
pump well configurations and player asymmetry. The results show flow behavior and
flux distribution neglected in a lumped model are important to consider when con-
sidering water budgets and policies.
3
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Chapter 2
An ensemble optimization framework
for coupled design of hydropower
contracts and real-time reservoir
operating rules
2.1 Introduction
Hydroelectricity contributes 71% of global renewable electrical energy and 16% of
total global energy demand. Much of this energy is sold to institutional and industrial
clients under contractual agreements. A typical contract specifies a price to be paid
per unit energy for firm (continuous) power output or for a firm amount of energy to be
delivered over a designated time period. Such firm power agreements are complicated
by the fact that hydropower is an intrinsically uncertain energy source that depends
on variable river inflows. When determining a contract power or energy target, the
operator must trade off the risk of having to purchase make-up power during low-
inflow periods vs. the risk of forgoing potential income during high inflow periods.
Both of these situations can reduce net present value revenue if the contract target
is not properly chosen. Hydropower revenue depends not only on the contract terms,
but also on the inflow characteristics, facility specifications (e.g. reservoir geometry
and turbine capacity), electricity demand and pricing, and the operating rule used to
determine the reservoir release at any given time. This paper emphasizes connections
between inflow uncertainty and real-time operations, recognizing that management
of risk in hydropower generation is a much broader topic that involves many other
sources of uncertainty [161, [73], [231.
When developing a strategy for managing inflow uncertainty, it is best to deter-
mine the contract and the operating rule together. The optimum contract depends in
part on the operational strategy used to deal with inflow variability and the optimum
operating rule depends in part on the requirements specified in the contract. This
chapter addresses the coupled contract-operational design problem by simultaneously
deriving an optimum firm energy value and an associated real-time operating rule.
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Together, these maximize expected revenue over the contract period for given inflow
statistics, contract prices, and other inputs.
Optimization techniques have been used extensively by the reservoir operations
community, most often to derive operating rules than energy contracts. [821, [79], [41],
and [61] provide comprehensive literature reviews on methods to optimize reservoir
operation. In practice, most hydropower reservoirs are managed with deterministic
operating rules that fall under the umbrella of a Standard Operating Policy (SOP)
with hedging ([52], [751, [831). These rules typically relate the current reservoir release
to the current reservoir storage and do not attempt to predict or adjust for future
inflow variations.
Reservoir operators may be able to extract more benefit than can be achieved
with Standard Operating Policies if they adopt predictive rules that rely on prob-
abilistic models of future inflows. The gold standard of this approach is Stochastic
Dynamic Programming (SDP) [11]. The SDP method has been applied to the control
of a single reservoir and to networks of multiple reservoirs ([721,[84,1151,[17,[32,[33],
[80],[82]). The popularity of SDP lies in its flexibility to accept a variety of objec-
tives, constraints (equality and/or inequality), and random disturbance models. Its
main limitation is its computational complexity, which grows very quickly with the
number of state and control variables used to describe the reservoir system (the so-
called curse of dimensionality). This reflects the fact that SDP derives a general
control law that optimizes the complete trajectory of future releases for any feasible
current state. Several approximate SDP techniques have been developed to deal with
the method's computational demands. These take advantage of distinctive structural
features applicable to reservoir operations problems ([4],[12],[11],[421,[15]).
Stochastic Model Predictive Control (SMPC) ([26],[47],[62]) method is a limited
look ahead real-time optimization technique that also relies on probabilistic inflow
models. SMPC is generally less computationally intensive than SDP and is able to
readily handle complex constraints. This reflects the fact that SMPC optimizes the
current release only for a particular (observed) current state. SMPC plays an im-
portant role in process control where efficiency requires operating the system near
specified bounds on the state and the control. Examples of relevant SMPC applica-
tions include process control [27], reservoir operations ([5],[43]), irrigation ([53],[76]),
and supply chain management ([551,[601). Here we consider the performance ob-
tained with all three of the reservoir operating rules mentioned above (SOP, SDP,
and SMPC) when they are coupled with a contract optimization procedure.
2.2 Formulation of the reservoir problem
In this paper we illustrate the concept of coupled contract-operational design by
adopting a simple contract structure that serves to illustrate the connection between
a firm power commitment and the design of predictive real-time operating rules. We
suppose that an operator of a reservoir designed primarily for hydropower production
sells power to a single consumer, according to a contract agreed upon before operations
start. The consumer desires a dependable source of firm power, defined here as a
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specified power value generated continuously throughout a multiyear contract period.
An example is an industrial client, such as an aluminum manufacturer, who has a
continuous demand for fixed amount of power. The customer agrees to pay a specified
unit price ($MWhr 1 ) for the firm power, negotiated at the start of the contract
period and held fixed until the end of the period. Recognizing that it may not always
be possible to meet a particular firm power value when reservoir inflows are variable,
the contract stipulates that shortfalls be covered by the consumer, who buys makeup
power at the market price and passes on a fixed unit charge to the operator. If the
market price is below the shortfall charge the consumer benefits. If it is above then
the operator benefits. Similarly, the consumer agrees to buy surplus power for a
negotiated fixed price. If this price is above the market price the operator benefits.
If it is lower then the consumer benefits. The net result depends on the relationship
between variations in market prices and variations in inflows at the reservoir. Our
contract arrangement has the advantage of providing the reservoir operator with a
predictable pricing structure so the major source of operational uncertainty is inflow
variability rather than price variability. We quantify this uncertainty with revenue
probability distributions that apply for several different operating strategies.
Other types of contracts may able to better manage risk and perhaps improve
the operator's expected revenue. Examples relevant to hydropower applications are
discussed in the financial risk literature ([23],[16],[48]). These include methods that
provide various forms of insurance to protect the operator from uncertainty. The
advantage of our contract is that it insulates the operator from price fluctuations and
focuses attention on real-time operations. The ensemble-based optimization approach
introduced here is intended to provide a general framework that can be used to exam-
ine the implications of different operational strategies as well as different contractual
arrangements. Our fixed price contract provides a convenient way to show how this
framework can be applied.
In a discrete time problem formulation the firm power value can be interpreted as
an equivalent firm energy generated over a constant time step. Our coupled contract-
operational design optimization focuses on two types of decision variables: 1) the firm
energy value negotiated with the consumer and 2) the reservoir releases at a set of
regularly spaced decision times throughout the contract period. The releases may be
determined from an operating rule that is derived as part of the optimization process.
The optimum firm energy value and operating rule maximize the operator's expected
present value revenue in the presence of uncertain inflows, subject to relevant physical
constraints.
This coupled stochastic optimization problem can be solved with an iterative
algorithm that starts with an initial value for the firm energy value and an initial
operating rule based on this value. The algorithm evaluates the resulting revenue,
adjusts the contract energy to increase revenue, derives a new operating rule, and
again evaluates the revenue, continuing until the process converges (Figure 2-1).
It is helpful to describe the contract in a mathematical form suitable for the
optimization. Suppose for a given firm contract energy E, that the reservoir generates
actual energy Ek over the unit time interval [tk, t(k + 1)]. The revenue obtained over
this interval is determined by the piecewise linear concave revenue function illustrated
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Figure 2-1: Iterative search for optimum energy contract. The energy contract Ec
proposed at each iteration requires a new decision rule (turbine release vs. storage)
to maximize revenue.
in Figure 2-2:
g(E, Ec)
g(E, E,)
= a1l(Ek - Ec) + acEc
= a2(Ek - Ec) + zcEc
if EkEc
if Ek > Ec
(2.1)
(2.2)
Where Ec is the firm contract energy to be generated in each time interval during
the contract period and ai > ac > a2 are coefficients that define the price per unit
energy in ($MWhr- 1) that applies for different situations. The term acEc is the
revenue obtained if the contract is exactly satisfied i.e. Ek = Ec. If Ek is greater than
Ec, there is a surplus and the operator sells the additional energy Ek - Ec at a lower
rate a2 < ac. If Ek is less than Ec, there is a shortfall and the operator must purchase
makeup energy Ec--Ek at a higher rate a, > ac. As mentioned earlier, we assume that
the prices ac, a, and a 2 are fixed, but that Ec is a decision variable. In contracts based
on spot rather than fixed surplus and makeup power prices, variability in a,, ac,and
a2 could be an important contributor to revenue uncertainty. This extension can be
incorporated in the ensemble approach outlined here once the alternative contractual
arrangement is precisely defined.
We suppose that the contract period extends from times ti to tK and is divided
into K - 1 intervals of fixed duration At. The firm energy Ec needs to be known at
the beginning of the contract period when the contract is negotiated. By contrast, the
reservoir release Uk is most appropriately determined in real-time over each discrete
time interval in the contract period, as illustrated in Figure 2-3. Real-time operation
is important since it takes into account unanticipated variations in inflow and storage.
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Figure 2-2: Piecewise linear concave revenue function. The slope of the red-dotted
and black lines shows how the unit revenue at the contract energy compares to the
unit cost of makeup power at lower energy values and the unit revenue of surplus
energy at higher energy values
To examine the real-time aspect in more detail we need to characterize the dynamic
behavior of the reservoir system, which is described by the system states, releases,
and energy output. These variables can be related by a set of stochastic constraints.
For the single reservoir hydropower problem considered here the state vector Xk is
partitioned into a scalar reservoir storage Sk, observed at time tk, and a vector of
states bk that collectively describe an inflow time series model that could be estimated
from observed inflow data using system identification techniques [44]. The associated
state equations are:
Xk+1 = f(Xk,ukWk) (2-3)
Xk = [Sk, Ok (2.4)
Sk+1 = fs(Sk,Pkukwk) (2.5)
Ok+1 = AP(OkWk) (2.6)
Ik = M(4k) (2.7)
Here Ik is the total reservoir inflow over the time interval [tk, tk+1] , observed
at tk. This inflow is related to the time series model state Ok through a specified
function M(.). The scalar uk (the control variable) is the total reservoir release over
[tk, tk+1] (specified by the operator at tk) and Wk is a sequence of independent random
disturbances that drives the time series model. The time series model is used to
predict inflows for the predictive operating rules considered in our example. Specific
9
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Figure 2-3: Example representation of discrete reservoir variables defined over two
consecutive time intervals. The bottom panel shows the piecewise linear storage state
(S) over each interval. The top panel shows the piecewise constant turbine release
(u) and inflow (I) over each interval, with the inflow measurement (I) observed at
the end of the interval.
options for this model and its associated functions and variables are discussed in
Section 2.4.
The storage state equation is a mass balance expression that neglects evaporation
and seepage but includes spills:
Sk+1 = fs(Sk, bk,uk,wk) = Sk + At [Ik+1 (Vk,wk) - Uk] - Zk (2.8)
k = 0; S(O) So
Where the expressions in eqns 2.6 and 2.7 can be used to write Ik+1 in terms of
the state vector 4'k and disturbance Wk. This state equation is used by the predictive
operating rules to forecast storage from a particular predicted inflow sequence. The
reservoir spill Zk over [tk, tk+1] is given by an additional constraint:
Zk= max{Sk + At(Ik+1 - Uk] - Smax, 0} (2.9)
Where Smax(L3 ) is the reservoir capacity. The energy Ek generated by releases
over [tk, tk+11 is:
Ek - #(uk, hk, hk+)) = uk H(fs)dt (2.10)
t= k
Emax = 0(I,hmax, hmax)
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The reservoir head hk at time tk is related to the storage by a specified function
H(.) that depends on the reservoir geometry:
hk = H(Sk); hmax = H(Smax) (2.11)
The controlled release is constrained to be no greater than the turbine capacity Umax
Uk Umax (2.12)
For purposes of this study, the reservoir capacity, the head-storage function, and
the turbine capacity are all assumed to be given. Note that fluxes are defined over
K time intervals indexed by k = 0 : K - 1 and states are defined at K + 1 discrete
times indexed by k = 0 : K - 1. The time series notation can be made more
concise if the entire sequence of releases defined through any time hk is represented
by the vector u(0, 1,, k - 1) = u(0 : k - 1). Similar notation is used for sequences of
other variables. The desired solution to the real-time operations problem maximizes
the following expected present value objective, which measures performance over the
contract period [to, tK] for a given sequence of releases u(0 : K - 1), a given initial
state x0 , and a given firm energy value Ec:
J(UO:K-1, XO, Ec) EwOK _1 {Z(1+ r)-k [ g(E (U x xk+1), Ec) - azZk(uk, xk) + -K (XK)
k=0
(2.13)
Dependence on the vector of random inflow disturbances WO:K-1 is removed by
the expectation operation EO.:K The first term in the objective function expression
is the present values of the hydropower revenue. The second term azZk penalizes
reservoir spills that can cause downstream flooding. The final term gk(xK) (the
salvage value) assigns a prescribed benefit to reservoir storage at the final time. This
prevents the control strategy from emptying the reservoir at the end of the contract
period. Specification of the spill and salvage value terms is discussed in more detail
in Section 2.4.
The objective given in eqn 2.13 could be maximized simultaneously with respect
to the variables UO:K-1 and Ec, using the methods of mathematical programming, im-
posing the constraints identified above. Since the contract must be determined before
operations begin, at to, a simultaneous optimization of UO:K-1 and E, would require
the entire release history to also be derived at to, before there are any observations of
the actual states (open-loop control). Better revenue can generally be obtained if the
contract is determined at the initial time but the releases are determined in real-time,
as observations of the states become available (closed-loop control). This is possible
if the release at each time is derived directly from the observed state, as specified by
a closed loop operating rule (or decision function) of the following form:
Uk = pk(Xk) k = 0 : K - 1 (2.14)
If eqn 2.14 is substituted into eqn 2.13 the objective J can be written as a func-
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tional J0-K-1 (x, EC) that maps the K decision functions O:K-1 to the scalar revenue.
K-1
J CO:K-l (, EC) = EWOK1 {E (1 + r)~k[g(Ek(xo, 110:k, W:k), Ec) - a'zZk(Xo, Po:k, WO:k)]
k=O
-I- 9K(Xo, P:K-1, WO:K-1)
(2.15)
This is the real-time optimal control form of the optimization objective given in
eqn 2.13.
Note that the revenue, spill, and salvage terms are all random by virtue of their
dependence on the random disturbance vector WO:K-1. In our ensemble implementa-
tion of the stochastic optimal control problem, many random samples (or replicates)
of this vector are drawn from a population determined by the statistics of the inflow
time series model. Each inflow replicate gives a corresponding sample for each of the
three terms in the objective and for the objective as a whole. The objective replicates
provide equally likely predictions of the system performance for a given firm energy
and decision strategy. The expected objective value is estimated by the arithmetic
average of these replicates.
A real-time formulation of the operational part of the coupled optimization prob-
lem makes it possible to more precisely describe the iterative procedure outlined in
figure 2-1. If the current iterates (for iterations 1 = 1,, L ) of the decision function
and firm energy value are p i and E,. the new decision strategy t11 1 is obtained
by maximizing with respect to all decision functions that satisfy constraints eqns
2.4-2.12.
O 1 = arg max JLOK (XOE.) (2.16)
E,
This real-time optimal control sub-problem can be solved with the SDP, SMPC,
and PI methods described in more detail in Section 2.3. Then the new firm energy
value is obtained by maximizing J j+i (xo, Ec) with respect to the scalar Ec:
E.+1 = arg max J 1 (xo, Ec) (2.17)C ~ E, JU:K-1
This scalar optimization sub-problem can be readily solved with a one-dimensional
search procedure (e.g. the Newton Rhapson method). The iteration can be initialized
with a plausible firm energy value, such as the energy that could be generated with
a constant inflow somewhat less than the observed mean.
We denote the converged decision function and firm power by "O*K_1 and Ec* . We
are unaware of a convergence proof for this algorithm but it has always converged
in less than 20 iterations in the many sensitivity analyses we have performed for all
of the predictive operating rules considered in Section 2.4. The iterates are well-
constrained by the inflows and by the physical limitations of the reservoir system and
all discontinuities (e.g. the reservoir spill expression) are approximated by locally
smooth functions. Our experience has been that these factors lead to quick and
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reliable convergence.
The random inflow disturbance replicates generated in the iteration outlined above
are used to guide the search procedure. In a practical application, the resulting opti-
mum decision function and firm energy are used to determine the actual release from
the reservoir. The corresponding actual inflow disturbance sequence will generally be
different from any of the replicates used in the iteration. It is useful to quantify how
well the reservoir system might work in such a situation. Since we do not know the
actual inflows in advance such a performance assessment should account for uncer-
tainty by considering a range of possible actual inflow disturbances. The framework
for this assessment can be formulated in terms of the actual objective J',. which
40:K-1'
depends on the actual inflow disturbance vector Wa K_1 and the actual initial state as
follows:
K-1
J2:K-(W:K -1 xK E - (1 - rk [g(Ex, :ok L ), E*) -GzZk(Xo, Ik W:k]
k=O
+gk(X 0 ,p 0.:K-1 0:K-)
(2.18)
Here E, and the decision functions yP K_1 from eqn 2.16 have been identified from
the optimization procedure and can be considered given. At the initial time, before
the inflows are observed, W.K1 can be viewed as a random sequence sampled from the
same population as the sequence that appears in eqn 2.15. If Xg is also unknown at the
initial time it can also be treated as a random variable with a specified distribution.
We call a collection of w(O : K - 1)a and xg samples a meta-ensemble to distinguish
it from the ensemble WO:K1 used in the iterative search procedure.
If eqn 2.18 is evaluated for a meta- ensemble of Wa:K_1 and xg samples we can
derive the probability distribution of the actual present value revenue before inflows
are actually observed. This distribution can be used to compute various revenue
statistics such as the mean, upper quantile, etc. The process is carried out for selected
decision rules in section 2.4.
2.3 Options for deriving real-time decision strategy
The options for deriving the operating rule pl(Xk) use different methods to relate the
current release to the current state. This section reviews some of the most promising
alternatives.
2.3.1 Stochastic Dynamic Programming
Stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) provides a comprehensive approach for de-
riving real-time operating rules before real-time operations begin, without simplifying
assumptions. In the discrete time version used here this method divides the real-time
control problem of 2.14 and 2.15 into a sequence of K nested sub-problems that
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are solved with a recursion ([101,[111). Each subproblem optimizes a time-dependent
objective (the benefit-to-go) from a particular time to the end of the contract pe-
riod. The objective for subproblem k, which is associated with time interval [tk-1, tk]
(commonly called Stage k) is:
JSDP,k(xk, Ec) = max [E-f{g[Ek (xk.pk(xXk), Wk), Ec1 - azZk(xk, Ak (Xk), wk)
IMk(Xk) ( 9
+ (1 + r)- 1 JSDPk+ (xk+, Ec)}] (2.19)
The problems are nested because sub-problem k depends on the solution of sub-
problem k +1. The solution is computed with a backward recursion that moves stage
by stage from the final to initial contract times. A decision function pk(Xk) is derived
and stored for sub-problem k (for k = K - 1,, 0), for a given Ec. The recursion is
initialized at k = K:
JSDP,K(XK, Ec) = gK(XK) (2.20)
Note that the objective JSDPO(XO, Ec) obtained at the end of the recursion is equal
to optimal revenue objective JSDPO(x0, Ec) defined in 2.17. Also, the state equation
can be used to express the term JSDPk+1(xk+1, E,) appearing in 2.19 as a functional
that depends on Xk, Pk (Xk), Wk and Ec. When the recursion is complete, the decision
functions for all intervals are available and can be used to compute releases from
actual observations in a forward real-time sweep (for k = K - 17, 0).
The maximization over Pk(Xk) of the expected revenue in eqn 2.19 gives the op-
timal release Stage k for any given value of the current state Xk. In practice, the
state vector is usually discretized into a finite number of grid points and the optimum
release value u* is found at each of these points by maximizing the argument of eqn
2.19, with E, fixed. The releases at the grid points are interpolated to give a decision
function Pk(Xk) that applies at any feasible value of the state ([171,[351). The expec-
tation operation appearing in eqns 2.18 and 2.19 is approximated by the mean over
an ensemble of synthetically generated Wk samples, as discussed in Section 2.2.
Some distinctive aspects of the dynamic programming approach include:
" the decision rules for all times are derived prior to the start of operations but
each reservoir release is derived in real-time, after the current state is observed;
" the decision function in our formulation depends on the energy contract;
" the computational effort grows rapidly as the problem size increases. If N,, N,
and N,, are the number of discretized states, controls and inflow disturbances
and the optimization horizon is K time steps, then the SDP algorithm requires
KN ,NNo, functional evaluations of the objective function;
" performance is dependent on the accuracy of the predictive inflow and storage
models (the stochastic state equations)
" the algorithm implicitly accounts for the information provided by future mea-
surements by relying on conditional probabilities that determine the likelihood
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of a transition from a particular observed state at tk to another state at tk+1-
The computational demands of SDP tend to limit its application to problems with
relatively small state vectors. In the hydropower operations context this implies that
the problem needs to include only a few reservoirs and/or low dimensional inflow
models.
2.3.2 Stochastic model predictive control
Stochastic model predictive control (SMPC) derives the optimal release u* at each
decision time by maximizing expected revenue over a limited duration window extend-
ing into the future. The complete series of reservoir releases is computed by carrying
out a new optimization at every time step rather than using a pre-computed decision
rule. The objective for Problem k originating at tk is the present value revenue from
tk to tK, based on eqn 2.15 and written directly in terms of releases rather than in
terms of a decision function:
k+w-1
JSMPC,k (Uk:k+w-1, Xk, Ec) = Ew k+1_{ 3 (1 + r)-'[g[Ei(Xk, Uk:i, Wk:i, Ec1 - azZi(xi, Uk, Wkj]
+ gk+w(xk7 Uk:k~w-1, Wk:k+w-1)}
(2.21)
The expectation operator is approximated by the mean over an ensemble of synthet-
ically generated samples Wk:k+w-1. The optimization is carried out over a moving
window of length wK - k time steps. This window spans the interval [tk, tk+,w.
An optimal release sequence over the current SMPC window is obtained by max-
imizing JSMPC,k(Xk, Ec) with respect to the releases:
Uk:k+w-1 =arg max JSMPC,k(uk:k+w-1, Xk.Ec) (2.22)
Uk:k+w-1
Although this optimization gives an entire sequence of optimal releases over the
current time horizon, only the first release Uk is actually applied to the reservoir
system (at tk) since the remaining releases are recomputed at tk+1 when a new value
of the state Xk+1 is observed. This process is repeated for every decision time, until
the moving window reaches the end of the contract period. The vector of current
states XO:K-1 and the associated vector of SMPC releases UO:K-1 implicitly define a
set of time-dependent decision functions P:K-1 through the relationship Uk =- k(Xk)
for k = 0 : K - 1. For convenience, we refer to the SMPC decision as a function in
the discussion below, even though SMPC does not explicitly derive such a function.
The distinctive aspects of model predictive control include:
* releases are evaluated only for observed state values, not all possible values;
" the decision function in our formulation depends on the contract energy;
* the decision function is defined implicitly and is available during operations only
at the current time (not earlier);
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" future revenue is evaluated approximately, over a limited duration time horizon;
" performance is dependent on the accuracy of the predictive inflow and storage
models (the stochastic state equations)
" SMPC is approximate, even in the limit as the time horizon becomes infinitely
long, because it does not account for the impact of the future measurements,
" computational effort is generally less than SDP, especially for large problems.
2.3.3 Standard operating policy
Both SDP and SMPC make an effort to predict the effect of future uncertain per-
formance by averaging present value revenue over an ensemble of possible inflow
disturbances. By contrast, deterministic (non-predictive) operating rules, such as
the Standard Operating Policy (SOP) (178],[821) do not consider the possible impact
of future inflows. These rules typically are heuristic and time-invariant (Figure 2-4).
They do not optimize a particular objective and they are specified rather than derived
functions of the system state. Non-predictive standard operating policies are easy to
implement and convenient for multi-purpose reservoir operations but cannot gener-
ally be expected to perform as well in a single-purpose hydropower application as
alternatives that utilize information about inflow variability and reservoir dynamics.
They are considered here because they are widely used in practice and they provide
benchmarks for assessing the potential performance improvement offered by predic-
tive operating rules such as SDP and SMPC. Figure 2-4 shows two SOP variants. The
simplest option, indicated by the black curve, releases all available water up to a nom-
inal value equal to the mean inflow uom = I when the storage is Snom - O.lASmax.
This nominal release is maintained until a nominal storage level Snom + O.lASmax
is reached. At that point additional water is released up to the maximum turbine
capacity uma . Beyond that, excess water must be spilled. The modified red curve
hedges the release rule by smoothing abrupt transitions between low, nominal, and
high storage conditions.
2.3.4 Perfect information
Reservoir releases and revenues derived by assuming perfect knowledge of future in-
flows provide useful upper bounds on the performance that can be obtained for a
particular actual inflow. In this case releases can be expressed in terms of a decision
function but they need not be derived in real time. Instead, they can be computed
aby maximizing 2.15 with the assumption that the inflow disturbances Wo:_ 1 = W" _1
are not random but are known perfectly:
K-1
JpIQL:K-1, W:K-1, xa, E,) = (i + r)~i[g[E,(xa, U0:, WJ.), Ec] - azZ(xa , UO:, Wg:j)]
i=O
9K(xa, U:K-1, O:K-1)
(2.23)
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Figure 2-4: Schematic representation of two typical Standard Operating Policies,
with the reservoir release expressed as a function of currently available storage. De-
viations of the red (hedged) curve from the black (standard) curve indicate an effort
to moderate abrupt transitions between low, nominal, and high storage conditions.
This problem can be solved with a standard non-linear programming algorithm
since perfect information allows all releases to be computed at once, in batch rather
than real-time mode. No reservoir operations method with imperfect information can
do better than the perfect information case when presented with the same actual
inflow.
2.4 Results and discussion
2.4.1 Setup of the example problem
The problem formulation and solution methods described above are tested here on
a typical example using an ensemble of synthetically generated inflows. This Monte
Carlo approach enables us to derive revenue probability distributions that quantify
the risk associated with different contract selection/ real-time operations strategies.
We suppose that the reservoir is designed primarily to generate hydropower and has
characteristics similar to facilities such as Hoover Dam, USA; Tehri Dam, India; or
and Itaipu Dam, Paraguay (161,[22]). Figure 2-5 shows the generic reservoir geometry
and head vs. storage relation used in our example. The methods of this paper can
be applied to any reservoir geometry as long as the storage vs. surface area and the
head functions are provided. The standard operating policy used in the example is a
non-dimensional version of Figure 2-4 that provides hedging by using a cubic function
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(red curve) to smooth transitions between the straight lines (black curve). The black
lines are defined by the storage and release break points indicated in the figure.
Reservoir Inflow
Head.. 0.6--
Storage..2
0 '-2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 08 1
Turbine Release Volume/ Volume
Figure 2-5: Reservoir geometry for the example problem. Left panel shows reservoir
configuration and right panel plots the storage vs. head curve for the example
For the example we consider a single state random inflow model that gives suffi-
cient variability to examine firm power shortages and surpluses as well as occasional
spills. The normalized log of the inflow is a positive ARI time series generated from
a specified mean inflow, variance, and single lag correlation. The corresponding state
equations are special cases of 2.14 and 2.6.
Sk+1 = fs(Sk, k,uk,wk)
= Sk + At[Ik+l - Uk] - Zk
= Sk + At[Iexp(pV,0k + Wk) - Uk] - Zk (2.24)
Obk+ 1 f~b (4k, Wk) =P 4')k + Wk
po ~ N( , W k ~ (, -
where ppsi is the single lag correlation of 4 k and the log normal inflow Ik is related
to the unitless state /k by:
Ik = M( =I exp Ok (2.25)
The time-invariant mean and variance of Ok are computed from the specified mean
and variance of Ik
2 0n2
2 (2.26)
- ; oj= In( + 1) (.6
2I, oj are specified inflow mean and variance. The time-invariant mean and variance
of Wk are obtained from:
-= (1 - p)/; of = (1 - p2 )o, (2.27)
The ARI model has the advantage, for testing purposes, of being less smooth
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than higher-order autoregressive models but a more realistic representation of inflows
to a moderate size reservoir than noisier time series models. Seasonality could be
readily added if appropriate. In practice, the time series model should be estimated
from historical inflow data and should be kept sufficiently low-dimensional to make
an ensemble analysis of the predictive decision strategies computationally feasible.
A sensitivity analysis of the results can be conveniently formulated in terms of
a limited of non-dimensional variables and inputs that are formed from groups of
dimensional variables introduced above, using the definitions given in Tables 2.1 and
2.2. These non-dimensional quantities are identified by primed subscripts. Note that
there is no spill penalty (Qz = 0) in the nominal case. Also, the maximum possible
sustainable energy Emax = 0(I, hmax, hmax) appearing in Table 2.1 is achieved when
the reservoir head is fixed at its maximum value hmax= H(Smax) and the reservoir
inflow and turbine release are both fixed at I. The actual energy generated over a
given time step could exceed this value if the release exceeds the mean inflow. For the
example the dimensional problem objective function given in equation 2.13 and the
dimensional constraints given in 2.5 through 2.12 are converted to non-dimensional
forms by applying the definitions in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 as described in Appendix A.
All plots and sensitivity analysis results are expressed in terms of non-dimensional
variables.
Non-dimensional variable Definition Range or distribution
Storage = 0.0-1.0StoageSk Smax
Head h = h 0.0-1.0k hmax
Inflow Lognormal
Log Inflow V = log I 0.0-1.0
Release Non-negative
Spill Z A Non-negativek Smax
Current Revenue 9k= - Non-negative
Energy E = ; E' = - 0.0-1.0k Em~x I Emax
Objective R = O:K-l Non-negative
acEmax
Table 2.1: Non dimensional variables
The following subsections examine the results obtained by simulating the reservoir
operation with four different coupled contract selection / real-time operations strate-
gies based on Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP), Stochastic model Predictive
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Non-dimensional input Definition Value in example
Reservoir residence time e= U-T Nominal Ow = 12; Trg = 48
Maximum reservoir release u' - u 1.5
Contract Period K' = K 100At
MPC window length W = 12A t
Spill penalty coefficient ',= a'max Nominal: a = 0; ahigh = 20
Revenue Coefficients a= 2; '2 = a'=2a'=0.15
ac 2 ac 1
Log inflow parameters p4 , o po = 0.8, o2 = 0.18
Number of replicates N 50
Number of meta-replicates Na 200
Discount factor r 4%
Table 2.2: Non dimensional inputs
Control (SMPC), a Standard Operating Policy (SOP) and a Perfect Information Sce-
nario (PIS). They also consider the effect of varying influential dimensionless inputs
such as the non-dimensional residence time, spill coefficient, and log inflow statistics.
2.4.2 Hydropower revenue comparison
The overall performance of the four decision strategies described in Section 2.3 can be
assessed in terms of a number of performance measures, such as the net present value
of the hydropower revenue generated over the contract period, revenue volatility over
time, spill magnitude and frequency, etc. In our ensemble analysis many of these
performance measures are random variables by virtue of their dependence on random
inflows. To illustrate the capabilities of an ensemble approach we compare probability
distributions for the net present value of the four decision strategies introduced earlier.
Similar comparisons can be made of other performance measures. It is convenient to
compare revenue performance in terms of the dimensionless revenue ratio R defined
in Table 2.1. We first consider performance for the nominal input values given in
Table 2.2 and then for a few alternatives that use different values for some of these
inputs.
The perfect information strategy is unique among those considered here since it
relies on advance knowledge of the entire sequence of reservoir inflows. With perfect
inflow information, it is possible to derive a different optimum E, for each meta-
replicate in the Monte Carlo simulation. By contrast, each of the other strategies
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work with a single E, value that maximizes expected revenue over the entire inflow
ensemble for that particular strategy.
Figure 2-6 compares the kernel density estimates of probability distribution of
the revenue ratio for all four decision strategies for nominal inputs. The variation in
revenue observed for the perfect information (PIS) case depends only on the intrinsic
variability of the actual inflow, not on the algorithm's ability to predict this inflow
(since it has access to perfect inflow information). If the inflow for a particular actual
inflow meta-replicate is low for a prolonged period, revenue will be low, even though
the inflow is known perfectly. The other three decision rules are affected both by the
intrinsic variability of the actual inflow and by uncertainty in the inflow predictions
used to make release decisions. That is why there distributions are shifted to the left,
toward lower revenue. The SDP and SMPC strategies tend to be more sharply peaked
near their modes but have relatively long tails at lower revenue values, reflecting the
consequences of occasional poor predictions. The most visible property of the PIS is
its greater probability of yielding high revenue (R > 0.75).
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Figure 2-6: Probability density function of the revenue ratio for SDP, SMPC, SOP
and PIS operational techniques
Stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) is second among the alternatives in terms
of mean revenue since it makes best use of the ensemble inflow predictions when op-
timizing the current release. The backward recursion stores release strategies that
maximize the expected revenue for the remaining contract time from any value of the
state. These strategies can be recovered as the actual state values become known. By
contrast, stochastic model predictive control (SMPC) derives a current release that
maximizes expected revenue only from the current state. The replicates used in this
calculation may not reflect the actual evolution of the system at later times. Also,
the SMPC maximization is limited to a window that can be significantly shorter than
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the remaining contract time. For these reasons, SMPC is somewhat less likely to give
high revenues and more likely to give low revenues than SDP [42]. The non-predictive
standard operating policy performs the worst among the four alternatives, generating
the smallest mean revenue with the highest probability of low revenues. This reflects
the method's inability to adjust releases when near-future inflows and storages are
likely to be lower or higher than average, given current inflow and storage. By con-
trast, predictive methods such as SDP and SMPC adjust releases in anticipation of
possible future conditions. Table 2.3 lists the average revenue ratio computed over all
the inflow meta-replicates as well as the probability (in %) of achieving a low revenue
ratio below 0.5 or high ratio above 0.75. These percentages complement information
on the mean revenue by considering the probability of low or high revenue values
when comparing decision strategies.
2.4.3 Sample time series
The Monte Carlo simulation conducted in our example provides individual replicates
of relevant dynamic variables such as the inflow, storage, release, and energy output
as well as the revenue probability distributions discussed above. Figure 2-7 compares
these variables for four different decision strategies, all using the nominal inputs from
Table 2.2. Each of these four cases maximizes one of the decision strategy objectives
specified in Section 2.3 by selecting the best possible combination of contract firm
energy and release history for a given actual inflow meta-replicate. The normalized
values of Ec for this example (expressed as a fraction of Ema,) are 0.61 for perfect in-
formation (PIS), 0.57 for stochastic dynamic programming (SDP), 0.51 for stochastic
model predictive control (SMPC), and 0.48 for the standard operating policy (SOP).
Comparing to Figure 2-6, the predictive strategies that generate higher firm power
are also more likely to produce higher revenue.
The top panel of Figure 2-7 shows the non-dimensional reservoir inflow series
together with four turbine release series computed in real time from the current
storage and inflow values, one for each of the four operating rules. The middle panel
shows the non-dimensional reservoir storage generated from these releases, with the
maximum normalized storage given by 1.0. The challenge for the operating rule is
to keep water levels high in order to maximize energy output while avoiding spills
that may have adverse downstream consequences and that also reduce the quantity
of water available for generating power.
In the nominal case shown in Figure 2-7 the SDP decision strategy generally
maintains higher storage than the other techniques, often approaching the reservoir
capacity. This reflects SDP's somewhat better predictive capabilities and also the fact
that spills are not explicitly penalized in the nominal case. SMPC behaves similarly
but gives somewhat more erratic releases and energy production. Higher variability
in energy together with a somewhat lower firm power value yield somewhat lower
revenue for SMPC. The PIS is able to maintain much more stable release and energy
production levels than any of the other methods. This reflects its ability to adjust
releases in anticipation of future high or low inflow events, which are known per-
fectly. The advantage of perfect information also allows PIS to maintain a storage
22
2 - Alo -SDP .- SMPC -.-SOP -FIS
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time
0
0.6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0 10 20 30 40 ~ 0 60 70 80 90 100
Time
Figure 2-7: Example reservoir operations with the four techniques (SDP, SMPC,
SOP and PIS) plotted for a particular inflow meta-replicate. Top panel: Reservoir
inflow time series and turbine release; Middle-panel: Reservoir storage; Bottom panel:
Energy generated. All quantities are non-dimensional.
level that is generally lower than the other alternatives, even though the PIS average
energy production and revenue are higher. The PIS result suggests the level of per-
formance that SDP and SMPC could approach if they had access to very accurate
inflow estimates.
2.4.4 Sensitivity analysis
All of the non-dimensional parameters listed in Table 2.2 affect the performance of
the four different operational strategies considered here. It is useful to examine in
detail two key dimensionless inputs, the normalized spill penalty coefficient oil and
the residence time Trres, and to briefly consider some of the others.
Sensitivity to spill penalty
A higher spill penalty tends to make the operational strategy more conservative,
lowering the water level below the maximum to reduce the magnitude and frequency of
spills. Table 2.3 includes a comparison of expected revenue and the probability of low
and high revenues for a moderately high non-dimensional spill penalty value vs. the
nominal case that does not penalize spills. Figure 2-8 shows revenue ratio probability
distributions for the same two spill penalty options. Increasing the spill penalty
consistently shifts the revenue probability density towards lower values (Figure 2-8).
As the penalty coefficient increases spill occurrences decrease from 15% to 2.7% for
dynamic programming, from 7% to 2.1% for model predictive control, and from 6% to
2.8% for the standard operating policy. Dynamic programming has the highest spill
occurrence for the unpenalized case because its more complete description of uncertain
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future conditions benefits more from pushing the reservoir system to capacity in order
to achieve maximum performance. Its more complete treatment of uncertainty also
enables dynamic programming to significantly reduce spill occurrence when spills are
penalized. By contrast, SOP gives a lower unpenalized spill occurrence but does not
achieve as great a reduction when spills are penalized. Model predictive control falls
somewhere in between.
The perfect information option shows a similar sensitivity to the spill penalty
but gives a lower unpenalized spill occurrence than any of the alternatives. Perfect
information makes the most difference during high inflow events that can cause spills
since it enables the operating rule to draw down the reservoir before high flows occur.
By reducing the amount of water lost to spills the perfect information option is able
to generate more hydropower and greater revenue. It is possible to decrease spill
occurrence somewhat further than indicated in Figure 2-8, by further increasing the
spill penalty. But this effect is ultimately limited by the inflow statistics. Overall,
perfect information and dynamic programming sacrifice revenue less than the other
alternatives when spills are penalized.
Low spill penalty High spill penalty
Technique alow = 0 (nominal) ahigh = 20
E(R) P(R <0.5) P(R > 0.75) E(R) P(R < 0.5) P(R > 0.75)
Perfect Information 0.69 3% 25% 0.62 18% 27%
Dynamic Programming 0.64 5% 8% 0.62 10% 4%
Model Predictive control 0.62 11% 6% 0.58 26% 2%
Standard operating 0.59 20% 5% 0.51 40% 0%
Table 2.3: Comparison of the average revenue ratio R and probability of low R (<
0.5) and a high R (>0.75) between the four operational strategies
Sensitivity to residence time
The residence time (Tr.es) provides a concise description of the combined effect of the
reservoir capacity and the mean inflow. Increasing the residence time (low inflows/
large reservoirs) reduces sensitivity to inflow variability, generating higher revenue
for extended periods. Figure 2-9 shows this behavior by plotting the revenue ratio
probability distributions for two different residence time options: low l,"w (nominal)
vs. high Trhg. Increasing the residence time reduces the effects of inflow variabil-
ity and shifts the revenue distributions towards higher values consistently across all
four techniques. The revenue distribution also narrows, reducing the risk of lower
revenues. Increasing the residence time increases the average revenue by 18% for
dynamic programming, 20% for model predictive control, and 18% for the standard
operating policy.
With a high residence time, high inflow events do not necessarily cause uncon-
trolled spills. They can be captured as storage, making it possible to temporarily
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Figure 2-8: Effect of spill penalty on the revenue density function. Mean revenue and
spill frequency both decrease as the spill penalty is increased from nominal ac'" = 0
to ahigh = 20
allow releases greater than the mean inflow (I). This can yield revenue ratios (R)
greater than 1 (see, for example, the perfect information case in Figure 2-9). For the
nominal spill penalty coefficient spill occurrences decrease significantly with increas-
ing residence time: 4.4% to 0.15% for perfect information, 15% to 3.8% for dynamic
programming, 7% to 1.9% for model predictive control and 6% to 0.3% for standard
operating policy. Although a large residence time reservoir is clearly desirable the
potential for increased capacity is practically limited by site constraints and higher
costs. When designing a new reservoir such considerations need to be included in the
optimization process.
Low residence time High residence time
Technique 
- 12 (nominal) IT h - 20
E(R) P(R < 0.5) P(R > 0.75) E(R) P(R < 0.5) P(R > 0.75)
Perfect Information 0.69 3% 25% 0.82 0% 75%
Dynamic Programming 0.64 5% 8% 0.78 1% 79%
Model Predictive control 0.62 11% 6% 0.77 3% 78%
Standard operating 0.59 20% 5% 0.70 6% 38%
Table 2.4: Comparison of the average revenue ratio R and probability of low R (<
0.5) and a high R (>0.75) between the four operational strategies
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Figure 2-9: Effect of residence time on the revenue density function. Increase in
residence time Tres (nominal " = 12, -high = 48) shifts the revenue distributions to
higher revenue in every operational strategy
Sensitivity to other factors
The preceding sections show that the comparative performance between the three
real-time operational strategies (SDP, SMPC and SOP) is sensitive to spill penalty
and residence time. Performance also depends on other parameters such as reser-
voir geometry, inflow statistics, discount rate, and revenue function coefficients. For
example, predictive operating strategies such as SDP and SMPC provide a greater
performance benefit if the reservoir inflow series has a high serial correlation pp and
a low or moderate variance o4. In such cases it is easier to predict near-term in-
flows. On the other hand, if the correlation is close to 1 and the variance is high
the possibility of extended periods of anomalous inflows leads to reduced benefit even
for predictive algorithms. The revenue function parameters can also influence perfor-
mance through their impact on both the contract value and real-time operations. For
example, increasing a, increases the penalty of generating a shortfall, which leads to
a more conservative contract that keeps reservoir storage near capacity and increases
spill occurrence. The combined effect of many sensitivities determines the relative
effectiveness of predictive vs. deterministic operating rules in any given situation.
2.5 Conclusions
This study prescribes a novel stochastic optimization approach that simultaneously
handles contract energy negotiation and real-time control of a hydropower reser-
voir. Contract selection and revenue performance are closely coupled to the choice
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of operational strategy used. Predictive techniques such as stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming (SDP) and stochastic model predictive control (SMPC) give significantly
better revenue (mean improvement > 10%) than a non-predictive standard operating
policy (SOP) for the nominal conditions considered here. For other conditions the
improvement may be either greater or less. Predictive techniques tend to work best
in situations where reservoir inflow statistics favor the use of inflow and storage fore-
casts for optimizing revenue. Between the two predictive techniques, SDP generates
higher revenue than SMPC but can be more computationally demanding, especially
for multi-reservoir systems.
Sensitivity analysis indicates that a high spill penalty has a negative impact on
revenue since it leads to strategies that operate the reservoir at a lower storage level.
Reservoirs with a higher residence time generate higher revenues and result in less
spill since the sensitivity to inflow variability decreases.
In addition to focusing on firm power deliveries and revenue, the conceptual frame-
work presented here provides a probabilistic perspective that quantifies both revenue
and spill risk. This framework can be readily adapted to accommodate different
reservoir shapes, inflow statistics and revenue functions. It can also be extended
to multi-reservoir systems. A stochastic approach that focuses on the probability
distribution of revenue can provide useful insights and tangible benefits for both hy-
dropower reservoir operations and contract negotiations.
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Chapter 3
Managing groundwater as a common
pool resource: A
multi-compartmental approach
3.1 Introduction and context
3.1.1 Background
Groundwater is the largest reserve of liquid fresh water on earth. It plays an espe-
cially important role in providing a reliable water supply for irrigated agriculture,
contributing about 40% of all irrigation water ([2],[31],[69]). Given this importance,
it is natural that there is widespread concern about declines in groundwater storage in
the western United States, northern India, northeastern China, and other important
farming regions. Although groundwater storage naturally fluctuates with variations
in local climate most of the decline in regions with significant depletion is due to
human activities, particularly increases in agricultural withdrawals (138],[77],[67]).
Since a groundwater reservoir acts as a buffer that smooths out short-term me-
teorological fluctuations, some intentional variation in storage can be considered to
be good management practice. However, when aquifer outflows remain above inflows
for an extended period of time groundwater levels can decline sufficiently to have
adverse impacts. These include increases in cost and decreases in accessibility as
well as undesirable impacts on groundwater water quality if drawdowns increase the
intrusion of water from formations with higher salt content. Groundwater depletion
can also decrease recharge to surface water ecosystems that are closely coupled to
groundwater. The effects of depletion can be irreversible in cases where drawdowns
are sufficient to change aquifer storage capacity through subsidence ([25],[21])
The risks of long-term groundwater depletion have focused considerable attention
on better understanding of the factors that may encourage or discourage undesirable
depletion. Many researchers have posed groundwater depletion as a common pool
problem and, more specifically, as a non-cooperative non-zero sum dynamic game
([54],[591,[63j,[51j,[49j). The resource is characterized as non-exclusive and openly
accessible to a number of players (or agents). Each player competes to acquire, over
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time, as much of the resource as needed to maximize his own discounted net benefit
(revenue minus cost), subject to physical constraints.
There is an incentive for each player to remove groundwater sooner, when water
levels are higher and pumping is less expensive, than later, after water levels have
dropped in response to the collective actions of all the players. The situation is fur-
ther complicated by the possibility that a player's access to groundwater may be lost
when the local water level falls below the well depth. The incentive to extract ground-
water before water levels fall further can lower net benefit for all unless mechanisms
for cooperation are introduced. This result is supported by game theoretic analysis,
which provides a way to evaluate the strategic externality that results from uncoop-
erative behavior ([54],[59],[63,[64]). However, the magnitude of this externaltity and
the significance of the economic inefficiency induced by uncooperative groundwater
exploitation have been debated [39].
A number of studies have analyzed common pool water management as a single
player optimization problem. In this case the problem is posed from either i) the
perspective of a 'social planner' who manages the entire resource or directs every-
one's individual water use to maximize an appropriate measure of aggregate long-term
benefit or ii) the perspective of a 'myopic' player pumping without regard for future
consequences or the actions of other players. ([81],[681,[29]). In the context of ground-
water depletion, the first option is typically solved as an optimal control problem. The
second option is solved by equating the current marginal benefit of pumping to the
current marginal cost. Gisser [3] compare these extremes using a simplified 'bucket
model' of a groundwater aquifer. When all pumped water is evapotranspired this
model can be written in discrete time as:
___ AhkASk = AO Ak R - Z u' (3.1)At Atk
Where AS is the change in the stock over stage (or decision interval) k. The time index
identifies k = 1,, K stages that are each of duration At , with stage k extending from
tk to tk+1 . The specified input A is the horizontal area of the study region, 0 is the
specific yield for unconfined aquifers and the storage coefficient for confined aquifers,
and hk is the spatially averaged hydraulic head. The decision or control variable u'
is the player i's pumping rate over stage k, determined at time tk . Equation 3.1 is
initialized with a specified head value h, . The only external source of water in the
bucket model is a constant recharge R that does not depend on pumping. Also, there
is no lower limit on storage so the only factor restricting aquifer depletion is pumping
cost.
The Gisser and Sanchez [31 analysis gives nearly the same exponentially decaying
pumping rates and groundwater levels for the social optimal and myopic options.
This result has been widely interpreted to contradict the presumption that a player
pursuing only short-term gain will deplete a groundwater resource much more than
a player with a longer-term perspective. Koundouri [39] provides a comprehensive
review of research prompted by the Gisser and Sanchez result as well as of broader
issues related to the control of groundwater depletion. She indicates that a number of
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case studies support the Gisser and Sanchez conclusions. Other relevant assessments
of the single-player management problem include Loaiciga [451, Brozovic [14], and
Madani [46]. None of these directly address non-cooperative behavior of multiple
players.
Studies of the multi-player non-cooperative groundwater depletion problem of-
ten focus primarily on qualitative properties of Nash equilibrium solutions ([54],[59]).
Some game theoretic analyses have been able to obtain quantitative solutions by mak-
ing various simplifications, including steady-state assumptions ([63],[641,[51]). Nakao
et. al [511 quantify the strategic effects of non-cooperation using a bucket model for
the Hueco Bolson aquifer shared by Texas and Mexico. Mueller et al [491 solved a
two time-step dynamic groundwater game using time-averaged hydrologic response
functions derived from a fully dynamic and spatially distributed groundwater model.
This paper builds on related studies by Saak and Peterson [65] and Saleh et. al [661
that account for the spatial configuration of the player's wells.
Multi-player groundwater game studies have clarified important distinctions be-
tween open loop (path) and closed loop (decision rule) Nash equilibria and have
identified the roles of pumping cost and storage limits in restraining depletion. How-
ever, they either do not quantify the magnitude of the inefficiency caused by non-
cooperative behavior or they look only at specialized situations that permit the game
problem to be readily solved. In order to use game theory to better understand
the causes and implications of non-cooperative depletion we need a problem descrip-
tion that captures essential economic and hydrologic features while also remaining
computationally tractable.
3.1.2 Factors influencing the realism of groundwater common
pool formulations
Benefit and Cost functions
Since groundwater pumped for irrigated agriculture is typically used on site to grow
crops its value is measured in terms of the derived demand for agricultural products.
A particular player's demand for groundwater can change in response to changes in
water availability from other sources (including rainfall) or changes in the market
prices and/or the yields of alternative crops. Groundwater extraction is affected by
energy costs as well as by the behavior of other players. Uncertain fluctuations in
meteorological variables, crop prices, and the cost of energy imply a need to formulate
the problem in terms of real-time closed loop (or feedback) rather than open-loop
player decision rules since benefits and costs can be expected to change over time.
Boundary conditions and steady-state solutions
The bucket model of equation 3.1 is the simplest possible approximation of a realistic
groundwater model. Its single state is the bucket water level, which can be interpreted
as a spatially averaged value of hydraulic head. The only source of water is a specified
constant recharge and water can leave only through pumping ([54],[371,[65],[74],[57]).
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These assumptions imply that the bucket model is at steady state only if the total
water pumped is exactly equal to the constant recharge. Also, pumping costs are
the same for all players and depend on the spatially averaged head rather than the
drawdown at individual player wells. Bredehoeft [13] points out the limitations of
sustainability assessments based on the bucket model. In particular, he notes that
specified head aquifer boundaries often play an important role in practice and need
to be included. The time-dependent fluxes crossing such boundaries generally depend
on the system state as well as the specified boundary heads.
Stock and boundary flux limitations
In most game theoretic analyses of the groundwater common pool problem pumping
cost is the only factor limiting extraction. This is because the aquifer depth, and
therefore the stock of groundwater, is assumed to be infinite, so that the aquifer can
be depleted indefinitely at an arbitrary rate except for restraints imposed by pumping
cost. In reality, continuous pumping at sufficiently high rates can eventually deplete
the groundwater stock or reduce boundary fluxes from external sources such as rivers,
putting physical limits on pumping even when cost restraints do not apply. Stock
and flux limitations can be important when the pumping cost is low (e.g. subsidized)
and/or the aquifer depth is relatively small. However, these effects are rarely included
in non-cooperative game formulations because of the mathematical complications they
introduce. Stock and boundary flux limitations need to be considered to provide for
the full range of possibilities in aquifer management.
Player heterogeneity and number of players
The realism of a game description of the common pool groundwater problem is also
affected by assumptions made about player heterogeneity [65]. Although it may be
appropriate to assume that all agents are identical in some situations it is important
to understand how player differences can influence individual behavior and the overall
impact of exploitation when they do occur. Of particular interest are differences that
arise because different players grow different crops with different prices, yields, and
water requirements. These differences affect each agent's pumping decisions, with
some agents being rewarded more for increased pumping than others, even though
they share a common resource. An additional related factor is the effect of increasing
the number of players. It is particularly helpful to know how revenue efficiency might
change as the number of players increases above two.
In this chapter we consider a multi-compartment stream-aquifer model that ad-
dresses most of the issues identified above. Our approach expands the scope of clas-
sical Nash equilibrium solutions to the groundwater common pool problem while re-
taining the capability to derive closed form decision rules that apply for the important
special case of a quadratic objective with linear equality constraints (f7],1241,[1]). The
existence of a convenient closed form Nash equilibrium solution enables us consider
a number of interesting phenomena, including aquifer-river interactions, asymmetric
agent benefit functions, and the effects of dynamic changes in recharge and other
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inputs. Taken together, these investigations provide useful insight about player be-
havior over a range of decision strategies, hydrologic and economic conditions.
3.2 Formulation of the groundwater common pool
problem
3.2.1 Objectives and constraints
The groundwater common pool problem can be posed as an N-person finite horizon
non-cooperative discrete time deterministic game, following notation used by Basar
and Oldser [8]. The objective functional to be maximized by Player i is:
K-1
L'(u,., I N U N) = gkU---,Uk, Xk, Xk+1 gK(XK); = ,-,N
k=1 (3.2)
K-1
= (1+r)-k [B (u') -Cki(Uxk) -- gK(XK)
k=1
where u' is the control variable (water pumped, L 3T- 1) defined for Player i over stage
k and is a vector of Player i pumping rates for all K stages. The function g' is the net
benefit obtained by Player i over time step (or stage) k, is the system state vector at
discrete time tk , and gK(xK) is a specified terminal net benefit intended to account
for residual value of the resource at the end of the finite horizon. The discounted
net benefit in each stage($) is proportional to the difference between the current
revenue B'(u') from using pumped groundwater to grow crops and the current cost
of pumping Ck(uk, Xk) , where r is the discount rate. We assume that land is not a
limiting resource for any of the players and that the revenue function for each player
is strictly concave and monotonically increasing. Note that the current revenue for
player .i depends only on the water that player pumps, not on. the state. Also, the
current cost depends, via the state, on the past and present pumping rates of all
players.
The state vector is determined by a state equation that describes the temporal
evolution of the groundwater system. The discrete time form of this equation is:
Xk+1 = .fk(Xk, Uk, ... -, ; k=1--, K -- 1; x, given (3.3)
In the rest of this paper we assume a constant discrete time step of one year to
coincide with a typical crop cycle. All flux variables are annual totals and all states
are defined at the beginning of the water year. The dynamic game problem defined
in equations 3.2 and 3.3 does not have a unique solution unless further restrictions
or information are included. One way to narrow the scope of possible solutions is to
seek Nash equilibria [8], as discussed in the next section. Another is to consider only
a single player.
In principle, the state equation for the groundwater common pool problem can
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be derived by discretizing the spatially distributed groundwater flow equation and
associated initial and boundary conditions over time and space. This approach can
account for the complexities of real world aquifers, including local drawdowns at
pumping wells, but it generates a large state vector that is comparable in size to the
number of discrete grid cells and greatly increases the computational difficulty of the
dynamic game problem. An alternative popular in classical optimization studies is to
use a time-dependent version of a response matrix, which relates the spatially averaged
heads in pumping cells directly to the player pumping rates. The response matrix
can be derived from the discretized groundwater equation, outside the optimization
algorithm ([30],[49]). This approach reduces the size of the system state but the
resulting state constraint does not have the recursive form given in equation 3.3.
This complicates analysis of uncooperative games that rely on dynamic programming
methods to derive subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solutions.
Many of the key physical phenomena included in a detailed groundwater model
can be captured in a computationally efficient compartmental model that can be
viewed as an extension of the bucket model. We demonstrate the concept here with
a two-compartment model that distinguishes outer (recharge) and inner (pumping)
portions of an unconfined aquifer and also adds a specified head river boundary that
can act as either a source or a sink of water. This model, which is illustrated in Figure
3-1, has the following form:
A Ahok AoOofok(xk) = Rk - AoI(hok - hlk) (3.4)A At
A AO hok Ao0ofok(xk ) = R - AoI(hok - hlk) (3.5)
Xk [hok, hIk]T (3.6)
Outer Aquifer
inner Aquifer
R ver
Figure 3-1: Schematic representation of the lumped two-state model
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Under natural unpumped conditions groundwater flows from the outer recharge
area through the inner aquifer to the river. When pumping is added some of the
recharge is diverted from the river for irrigation. If the pumping rate is high enough
to draw the inner aquifer head below the river head the flow to the river can reverse,
with the river acting as a source of water rather than a sink. The two-compartment
model reduces to the bucket model if A 0 , becomes very large so hlk _ hok and if
AIR = 0. Then the inner and outer compartment equations can be summed to give a
single bucket state equation.
Our analysis of the common pool problem for the multi-compartment model
adopts a quadratic current benefit function that reflects a linearly decreasing marginal
demand for water ([28],[361):
B (u') = u- bi(u) 2 ; b > 0, b' < 0
b' (3.7)10 < U, < U"ak<U< max 1bI
Note that the quadratic benefit function adopted here is monotonically increasing for
pumping rates that satisfy the last inequality constraint. This constraint insures that
the marginal demand remains non-negative. At the rate U4 ax additional water no
longer provides any benefit (e.g. because land is limiting).
The current pumping cost for Player i depends on the energy expended to pump
groundwater at a rate from the inner aquifer water level to the ground surface eleva-
tion h9 :
Cl{i4, hlk) = c(hg - hIk)u'; c' > 0 (3.8)
where c represents the price per unit energy consumed and 7 is the pump efficiency
(both of these parameters are assumed to be the same for all players). For simplicity,
amortized capital costs of well construction are neglected but they could be included
in equation 3.7 if desired. This cost function uses the spatially averaged inner aquifer
head hlk to determine the pumping cost for each of the players. In reality, player
pumping costs depend on the local heads at the pumping wells. The local head can
be expected to vary throughout the aquifer and will generally be different at different
wells. The model's use of the spatially averaged inner aquifer head for cost estimation
is an approximation that is more accurate if there are many pumping wells (generally
more than one for each player) that are distributed more or less uniformly over the
aquifer area and if the aquifer transmissivity is high so the head gradients are small.
In that case, the pumped local head will be relatively uniform over the inner aquifer
(but lower than the unpumped local head) and the approximation that pumping cost
is proportional to hlk is adequate for investigation of the issues of interest in this
paper.
The objectives and state equations given above may be put in an affine-quadratic
form if the lateral flow coefficients are constants and the pumping rate constraint in
equation 3.7 is inactive. This is particularly convenient for computing Nash equilib-
rium solutions for discrete time games. The net benefit used here is an extension of
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the purely quadratic objective found in most texts on optimal control and dynamic
game theory [e.g. Basar and Olsder [8]], since it adds a cross term between the state
and control variable as well as terms that are linear in the state and control:
K-1
ul, ... , u XK x,KXK + S U uu,kUk + Xk Qx,kUk + S k 39
k=1
Xk+1 = Fkxk +Glul + ... +N NU + Ek (3.10)
The particular matrix coefficients can be obtained from the state equation and the
objective (3.8,3.7,3.4-3.6) Problems of this form have unique closed form solutions for
the decision strategies discussed below. Inequality constraints, such as those needed
to impose certain stock limitations, generally require numerical solutions.
3.2.2 Decision Strategies
The objective function and state equations in two-compartment problem description
are intentionally selected to give a convenient linear-quadratic solution structure.
The theory needed to derive a variety of decision strategies for optimal control and
dynamic game problems with this structure is well-established ([71). In order to apply
this theory we need to specify the nature of the decisions to be made by the players.
A decision strategy is written as a function .y(-) that relates the control variable Uk
for Player i to that player's information about the system at time tk:
Ut =7(9) (3.11)
where 77 denotes a particular information set that generally includes observations of
the system state. Here we will consider four alternative decision strategies.
1. Social optimum strategy
2. Open Loop Nash Equilibrium strategy
3. Subgame perfect or Feedback Nash Equilibrium strategy
4. Myopic strategy
Due to the particular quadratic structure of the objective function and affine structure
of the state dynamics all of these decision strategies yield affine decision rules that
depend on either the initial or current state:
= 4(x1 ) = T'x1 + F' (Open Loop) (3.12)
= (x1 ) = T'xk + F' (Social optimum, Feedback, Myopic) (3.13)
Although all four decision rules have an affine form their coefficient matrices have
different values and change over time in different ways. This leads to differences
in both dynamic and steady-state behavior. The following paragraphs summarize
distinctive aspects of the four alternatives.
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Social optimum (single player)
This case considers management of the entire aquifer by a single player who selects
pumping rates at all wells to maximize the total discounted net benefit obtained from
the resource over a finite planning horizon, given perfect knowledge of the current
state. This problem can be viewed as equivalent to a cooperative game where multiple
players agree to implement the single player solution and then distribute the benefit
in a mutually agreeable manner. The social optimum solution is of particular interest
because it establishes a benchmark that may be used to assess inefficiencies that
arise when multiple players compete in a non-cooperative game. The information set
for the single social optimum player consists of the state vector at the current time.
The sequence of pumping rates that maximizes 4.10 subject to 4.11 may be found
with dynamic programming, following an approach often used to solve a single player
optimal control problem. This gives an affine decision rule with coefficient matrices
derived from the player objectives and state equations [8]. Details are provided in
appendix B.2 towards the end of the study.
Open loop (multiple players with committed pumping decisions)
In an open loop uncooperative game the players maximize their individual discounted
net benefits but each commits at the initial time to a particular strategy for the entire
planning horizon, given perfect knowledge of the initial state. The open loop strategy
is of interest primarily because it is more readily computed than the more realistic
closed loop strategy ([20]). Here we seek open loop Nash equilibrium strategies that
arise when no player can benefit by changing his/her strategy while other players
keep their strategies unchanged. The open loop linear quadratic problem based on
4.10 and 4.11 can be solved as an equivalent static optimization problem for all player
pumping rates at all stages or as a coupled set of dynamic optimal control problems,
one for each player [8]. The coefficient matrices and conditions for a unique open loop
Nash equilibrium are described in the appendix section appendix B.3.
Feedback (multiple players with real-time pumping decisions)
The feedback decision strategy considered here insures that each player maximizes
anticipated future benefits at each stage of the game for any value of the current state,
using a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solution. This allows players to respond
in real time to unexpected changes in meteorological or cost inputs or to unexpected
(perhaps suboptimal) pumping decisions made by other players. A feedback strategy
can be less efficient than an open loop strategy since it must exclude options that incur
short-term losses to obtain longer term gains ([71],[191,[18]). However, a feedback
strategy is more realistic since it recognizes that players will respond dynamically to
changing conditions rather than strictly follow a strategy fixed at the initial time.
A closed loop subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy can be obtained from a
coupled set of dynamic programming problems, one for each player, using a backward
recursion [8]. For the linear affine problem of equations 4.10 and 4.11 the dynamic
programming algorithm takes the form of a set of coupled matrix difference equations.
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The coefficient matrices and conditions for a unique feedback Nash equilibrium are
described in appendix B.4.
Myopic (multiple players acting without regard for the future)
A player pursuing a myopic strategy maximizes current net benefits only, without
regard for future benefits or costs or for the actions of other players. Following Gisser
and Sanchez [3] the myopic strategy is obtained by equating marginal benefit to
marginal cost for a single player and solving for the pumping rate independently at
each stage. The coefficient matrices are described in appendix B.5.
3.3 Results and discussion
The common pool problem formulation outlined above enables us to address several
research questions related to the general theme of aquifer depletion. The emphasis
here is on issues that cannot be readily considered with simplified bucket models
but can be investigated by applying computationally convenient closed form solution
methods to the multi-compartment model pictured in Figure 3-1. The questions of
particular interest include:
" How does aquifer depletion change over time and how does pumping strategy
affect depletion dynamics?
" How much does revenue efficiency decrease with an uncooperative pumping
strategy, as compared to a cooperative or social optimal strategy?
" How is revenue efficiency affected by player asymmetry and by the number of
players exploiting the groundwater resource?
" How are depletion strategies affected by aquifer stock and river flux limitations?
These questions address interactions between physical constraints described by the
groundwater model and management aspects that depend on the benefits and costs
experienced by the various players and on their strategies for exploiting the resource.
Physical and management factors are explicitly integrated by using a game/optimization
approach to describe the groundwater extraction problem.
For specificity, we examine the above questions with a hypothetical example based
on a semi-arid irrigated region that is similar in some respects to California's San
Joaquin Valley. This example portrays a cross-section of an agricultural valley (over-
lying the inner aquifer of the compartmental model) that receives minimal rainfall
during the growing season and is recharged from a larger non-irrigated upland area
(the outer aquifer). Both aquifers are assumed to be unconfined. Some of the in-
ner aquifer groundwater may flow to or from a river running down the center of the
valley. The cropland area is divided, for purposes of this example, among players
who represent different irrigation districts that compete for the common stock of
groundwater.
38
Parameter Symbol Representative value
Outer Aquifer (recharge) area Ao 7200 km 2
Inner Aquifer (cropland) area A, 3600 km 2
Constant lateral flow coefficients AO, AIR 32.8, 9.8 km 2 yr-1
Hydraulic conductivity 6o1, VIIR 100, loom/day
Width (aquifer cross-section) w 80km
Traverse length AXo1 , AxIR 80km, 40km
Specific yield (unconfined) 0 0.1
Recharge rate R 100mmyr-1
Ground height h9 270 m above MSL
River head hR 200 m above MSL
Aquifer bottom elevation hb 0 m
Single stage time step At lyr
Number of stages K 60 yr
Discount rate r 3%
Number of players N 2
Benefit function parameters bI, bt 0.1$m--nkm- 2, -3.5 x 10 4 $m-2km-4
Pumping Cost parameter r/, cP 50%,0.12$kWhr-1
Table 3.1: Compartmental model input values
We focus on long-term groundwater depletion due to pumping in the inner aquifer.
Each player operates many individual wells scattered over a specified crop area. A
player's/district's pumpage at any given stage is the total water removed from its
wells. The wells are assumed to be distributed with sufficient density to justify
the approximation that pumping costs are determined by the spatially and annually
averaged inner aquifer head (see discussion in Section 3.2.1 above). In our nominal
case we assume that the lateral flow coefficients are constant, which implies that the
aquifer depth is large compared to head drawdown. The nominal benefit function
coefficients reflect the derived demand for pumped groundwater for growing a water-
intensive crop such as almonds, grown by all players. Table 3.1 summarizes the
nominal values for the compartmental model inputs similar to the San Joaquin valley
[581. Some of these are modified in subsequent sensitivity analyses.
3.3.1 Dynamical behavior - Nominal case with two identical
players
In the nominal case we consider a decline in water level and storage from a natural
unpumped steady state to a new pumped steady state when two identical players
compete for groundwater with constant lateral flow coefficients between compart-
ments. Figure 3-2 shows aquifer water level and total (sum over all players) pumping
time histories for the four decision strategies summarized in Section 3.2.2. Note that
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it takes a few hundred years for the aquifer system to reach a pumped steady state in
the nominal case. Figure 3-3 plots the results over a shorter 60 year time scale that
gives a better picture of pumping and storage dynamics. The pumping rate starts
at a high level, when pumping costs are low, and gradually decreases as the inner
aquifer water level falls and costs increase. The same basic pattern applies for all
four decision strategies, with the social optimum giving somewhat less pumping and
drawdown and the myopic strategy giving the most depletion.
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Figure 3-2: Time series simulation of the lumped two-state groundwater system for
the nominal case over a 200 year timescale. From an unpumped steady state, the
water level reduces to a lower steady state indicated in the top and bottom plots of
left panel which show outer and inner aquifer respectively. The right panel shows the
total pump rate with different strategies in comparison to the total recharge obtained
from the outer aquifer.
The decline in pumping rate shown in this example is typical of optimization
and game analyses based on decreasing marginal demand and increasing marginal
cost for pumped groundwater. Players can be expected to adjust to this decrease in
water availability in a number of ways. They can reduce the fraction of cropland that
is irrigated, switch to more water efficient and/or more profitable crops or improve
irrigation efficiency. Another possibility in some situations is to expand pumping
into new previously unpumped areas that are sufficiently far from existing wells for
there to be little additional drawdown in the existing pumped area. Either existing
or new players could farm the new areas. In any case, the combination of decreased
pumping in the original well area and expansion of pumping into new areas can lead
to a temporary increase in total pumpage, until there is no further possibility for
expansion and pumping rates in the new wells decrease from their initial high values.
This expansion option is not considered in the problem formulation given here since
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Figure 3-3: Closeup view of the first 60 years of simulation in the nominal case (figure
3-3) to emphasize the transient dynamics
the use of an average compartmental head for cost computations assumes that the well
density is already high. However, extensions that provide for expansion of pumping
into new areas could be important in some applications.
The multi-compartment model accounts for the fact that the players can draw wa-
ter from both the recharge area and the river [13]. In our nominal case the decreasing
inner aquifer head eventually falls below the river head indicated by the horizontal
green line, for all decision strategies. At that transition point the groundwater direc-
tion at the river changes from out of the aquifer to into the aquifer. The pumping rate
is initially much higher than recharge because water is being withdrawn from storage.
It gradually approaches a steady-state value above the recharge value because water
is also being drawn from the river. Flow from the river accounts for about 20% of
the total steady-state pumpage for the nominal case across the decision strategies.
3.3.2 Revenue efficiency for alternative decision strategies
The inefficiency incurred by non-cooperative and myopic strategies can be measured in
terms of the revenue lost, as compared to a socially optimum strategy that maximizes
total revenue for a given resource. Another useful performance measure is the increase
in steady-state groundwater pumpage above the social optimum value. The first row
of Table 3.2 summarizes these indicators for the four different decision strategies
for the nominal case. The percentage values in the table indicate revenue efficiency
decreases and pumping rate increases for each option. The economic inefficiencies
incurred by non-cooperative management of the reservoir in our examples are greater
than reported by Gisser and Sanchez but are still within the range of results cited
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Case Revenue (NPV) (x10 9$) Steady state pump rate (km 3yr- 1)Social OLNE FBNE Myopic Social OLNE FBNE Myopic
2.259 2.22 2.073 0.8925 0.9148 0.9735Nominal 2.3 1.8% 3.2% 9.9% 0.8552 4.4% 7% 14%
Variable 2.14 2.13 1.98 - - -2.19
recharge 2.8% 3% 9.7% - - -
Asymmetric 2.71 2.68 2.52 0.9517 1.006 1.078
players 2% 2.9% 8.7% 7% 13% 21%
Multiple 2.3 2.155 2.135 2.073 0.9165 0.9468 0.9735
(8) players 6.3% 7.2% 9.9% 7.7% 10.7% 14%
Table 3.2: Performance assessment of non-optimal management of the groundwater
system with respect to the social optimum. Percent values indicate relative difference
to the social optimum.
by Koundouri [40]. The maximum inefficiencies for the Nash feedback and myopic
solutions are 7.2% and 9.9% , respectively, for the 8 player case.
The Nash equilibrium and myopic strategies are more aggressive than the social
optimum in drawing down the groundwater stock during the most dynamic period.
The steady state heads and pumping rates shown in Figure 3-2 maintain the relative
ranking of decision strategies that developed during the transient period. The im-
portance of short-term behavior in establishing the degree of groundwater depletion
below natural conditions emphasizes the need to look at dynamic as well as steady
state solutions. Also, the early time phase with rapidly changing heads and pumping
rates is likely to be of more practical interest since the climatic and economic factors
that favor particular initial pumping rates could easily change over the long period
needed to reach steady state. The time to steady state depends significantly on phys-
ical properties such as the ratio between the recharge and pumping areas and the
coefficients that control lateral flow. These properties are not included in the bucket
model.
The open loop Nash solution pumps less and gives less depletion than the feedback
or myopic solutions since all players commit to a pumping schedule in advance, with-
out deviation. This commitment reduces player flexibility but brings the open loop
revenue efficiency closer to the social optimum than these other options [64]. On the
other hand, the open loop strategy lacks a real-time ability to respond to unforeseen
fluctuations in inputs such as recharge. This is apparent in Figure 3-4, which gives
head and total pumping trajectories obtained for a hypothetical changing recharge
history, shown in green on the pumping plot. The social optimum, open loop, and
feedback strategies are derived assuming that recharge remains constant at the nom-
inal value. Since the social optimum and feedback, as well as the myopic strategy,
obtain releases from a real-time decision rule that depends on the current state they
are able to adjust their pumping rates when recharges different than those assumed in
the decision rule derivation. By contrast, the open-loop trajectory remains the same
as if the recharge were constant and, as a result, tends to overpump in dry periods and
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underpump in wet periods. The result is that the open loop Nash equilibrium strat-
egy revenue performance reduces to the level of feedback Nash equilibrium strategy
(see Row 2 of Table 3.2).
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Figure 3-4: Time series simulation of the heads and the pump rates under variable
recharge conditions. Social optimum, Feedback Nash Equilibrium and Myopic strate-
gies dynamically adapt their decisions to unpredictable water level scenarios. Open
loop Nash equilibrium sticks to the pre-committed strategy and performs worse.
3.3.3 Asymmetrical benefit functions and multiple players
Our nominal case is based on two players who generate about 50000 $km-2yr-1 using
about 800mm of water per year ([34]). But players often grow different crops with
different yields, market prices, and water requirements. As an example we consider
how pumping is affected when one of the players grows a crop that can generates
20% more revenue per unit area than the crop considered in the nominal case with
the water requirement unchanged. The other player grows the nominal crop. Figure
3-5 shows on the left the resulting inner and outer aquifer heads and on the right
the individual pumping rates of the two players. The ordering of decision strategies
remains the same in terms total pumpage and the transient head behavior.
An important feature to notice in the individual pumping histories is the relative
distance of the non-cooperative strategies (OLNE and FBNE) from the myopic and
the social optimum strategies. The reduced impact of the player with the low value
crop tends to make this player adopt a more short-sighted (nearly myopic) strategy.
A number of studies have suggested that the revenue inefficiency associated with
uncooperative groundwater management increases as more players compete for the
resource [63]. A two player formulation, while analytically convenient, is often un-
realistic. Fortunately, it is straightforward to solve the nominal problem formulated
in Section 3.2 for a reasonably large number of players if the constraints have con-
stant lateral flow coefficients and are affine. Here we consider this case for from 1
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Figure 3-5: Head and total pumping time series for two players with asymmetric
objective functions. Top right panel gives pumping histories for the player with
the lower value crop while lower right panel gives the histories for the player with the
higher value crop. Different strategies pump different quantities of water to maximize
their net present revenue.
to 8 identical players, using the nominal inputs from Table 3.1 and a feedback Nash
equilibrium decision strategy (which is the same as the social optimum for N = 1 ).
The results verify that as the number of players increases the inner and outer aquifer
heads drop and pumping increases. As the number of players increases the future
impact of an individual player's action on the system becomes insignificant, leading
to a nearly myopic strategy. At N = 8 the feedback Nash and myopic solutions are
barely distinguishable. Similar results are obtained for the open loop strategy (not
shown). This comparison suggests that the uncooperative feedback revenue efficiency
decreases as the number of players grows but is bounded from below by the myopic
value.
3.3.4 Stock and river flux limitations
The variations on the nominal example considered in the above sections all assume
that pumping costs are sufficiently high to limit drawdown to a small fraction of
the aquifer depth, which is defined as the difference between the groundwater head
and the aquifer bottom elevation. In this case the unconfined lateral flow coefficients
can be approximated by constants. When pumping costs are low, pumping rates are
high, and the aquifer depth is relatively small, these coefficients should decrease to
reflect the fact that higher head gradients are needed to supply a given flux of water
(170],[9]). An approximate way to handle this is to assume the flow coefficients are
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Figure 3-6: Time series simulation of closed loop Nash equilibrium solution when
the number of agents increases (N=1,2,4,8). As the agents increase the inefficient
groundwater pumping increases till it reaches the asymptotic pumprate of the myopic
strategy
time-dependent and linearly proportional to the average flow depth of the associated
compartments:
AOIk =4No:w (hI 1,k+hok hb)
AXO1 2
AIRk =- AIRW( hI,k + hR,k
AxIR 2
where hb is the aquifer bottom elevation (common to both aquifers), w is the width
of the aquifer cross section, Axo0 and AXIR are distances between the centers of the
outer and inner aquifer and the inner aquifer and the river, and rc0  and KIR are
effective hydraulic conductivities across the two interfaces. In this formulation the
flow depths and lateral flow coefficients decrease as the head drops in response to
pumping. Additional inequality constraints insure that the heads remain above the
aquifer bottom elevation [59]:
hI,k> hb ho,k ;> hb (3.15)
Another relevant constraint is the limited capacity of the river to act as a water source
when the inner aquifer head is drawn down. In particular, we suppose in this example
that the flow QIR = AIR,k(hIk - hRk) withdrawn from the river as a result of pumping
cannot exceed a specified fraction f of the upstream inflow:
QRI fQRinf (3.16)
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The exact fraction of upstream inflow allowed could vary based on regulatory condi-
tions but cannot exceed f = 1.0.
If the lateral flow coefficients of 3.14 are used instead of the constants used in
the nominal case and the inequality constraints of 3.7,3.15, and 3.16 are added it is
no longer possible to use the closed form Ricatti-based solutions given in the Ap-
pendix to find the open loop and feedback decision strategies. Numerical solutions
can be derived using an iterative dynamic programming approach but existence and
uniqueness of the Nash equilibria are more difficult to demonstrate.
Fortunately, it is relatively straightforward to derive the single player (single objec-
tive) social optimum and myopic solutions when 3.7,3.14,3.15, and 3.16 are included
if we use a standard interior point algorithm to solve the resulting nonlinear optimiza-
tion problem. This more limited analysis (which omits the open loop and feedback
Nash strategies) can still be quite informative since the social optimal and myopic
head and revenue solutions are typically upper and lower bounds, respectively, for the
corresponding game solutions. The ordering of social optimum-open loop-feedback-
myopic solutions (from highest to lowest head and revenue) is apparent in all of the
results described above. A similar ordering is described by Provencher and Burt [591
and Rubio and Casino [631 in their steady-state analyses of groundwater depletion.
Given these observations, we examine here the results obtained for the social optimum
and myopic strategies when the flow coefficients have the head-dependent form given
in 3.14, the state equations are quadratic rather than affine, and the inequalities 3.7,
3.15, and 3.16 are added. These extensions provide an useful insight about the role
of stock and river flux limitations in the common pool problem.
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Figure 3-7: Time histories of the water level in the outer and inner aquifer and pump
rate with a non-linear lateral flow coefficient model and finite stock-flux constraint.
With a very low cost for pumping, the social and myopic strategy choose to drain the
inner aquifer head until they reach its bottom. At the aquifer bottom both strategies
are limited to maximum flux from the river equal to fluxmax = ( - hb) hR
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Figure 3-8: Time histories of the water level in the outer and inner aquifer and pump
rate with a non-linear lateral flow coefficient model and finite stock-flux constraint.
The social and myopic strategy do not reach the aquifer bottom, but hit the maximum
river-to-inner aquifer flux constraint fluxmax = fQRinf
To illustrate the significance of the stock and flux limitations, we use the values
for hb, rI, KrIR given in Table 3.1 and reduce the pumping cost to 0.001$kWhr- 1,
while keeping all other inputs at their nominal values. We consider two cases: the
first with an upstream river inflow that is much greater than the total maximum
irrigation demand and the second with an upstream inflow that is comparable to this
demand. Figure 3-7 shows the time series simulation of a high upstream flow case
(f = 0.1, QRinj, = 20km 3yr- 1). The lowered pumping cost allows the strategies to
pump higher volumes until they reach the aquifer bottom [h, = hb = 0] (See top
panel figure 3-7). Beyond this point the players can no longer increase the flux from
the river to the inner aquifer due to their fixed head difference. The inner aquifer
stock constraint of 3.15 becomes active and the river flux constraint of 3.16 remains
inactive. The total pumpage will eventually reach a steady state equal to the sum of
the total recharge and the fixed nominal flux from the river given by;
INIRW hR -_hb'
s= RAo +I hR (3.17)
Figure 3-8 shows the second low river inflow case with an upstream inflow rate pf
QRinf = 0.75km3yr-'). This corresponds to f = 1. The river flux constraint now
becomes active and the stock constraints remain inactive (see left top panel). Both
strategies eventually reach a steady state pumping rate equal to the sum of the
recharge rate and the flux constraint given by:
uss = RAo + fQRinf (3.18)
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These physical limitations are not revealed in an analysis that only uses cost to limit
pumpage.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter describes groundwater depletion as a multi-player non-cooperative dy-
namic game. The game is solved for various decision strategies with appropriate
optimization methods. Open loop and feedback Nash uncooperative game solutions
are solved with a convenient closed form approach that applies for affine-quadratic
player objective functions and affine equality constraints. The constraints are ob-
tained from a multi-compartment groundwater model formulated as a set of affine
state equations. This model, which represents the common pool resource, captures
essential physical features that affect the game solution. They include the existence
of a credible unpumped hydrologic steady-state, provision for realistic boundary con-
ditions, and stock and flux restrictions on depletion.
The example discussed in Section 3.3.1 provides an informative comparisons of
social optimum, open loop Nash, feedback Nash, and myopic decision strategies.
Comparisons are made for different problem formulations that consider asymmetric
player benefits, multiple players, and variable recharge. A single player following the
social optimum decision strategy consistently generates the largest net present value
revenue from the resource over a range of different situations. The social optimum is
followed by the open loop Nash equilibrium and a feedback Nash equilibrium, with
the myopic strategy giving the least revenue. However, the differences between these
strategies are sometimes small and never larger than 10% of the social optimum
revenue for the example considered here.
The open loop strategy does somewhat better than the other non-cooperative
strategies because it adheres to a pre-committed pumping trajectory that enables
players to take actions that may be detrimental in the short term in order to maximize
long term benefit. The feedback solution does not benefit from a prior commitment
but is better able to adapt to changing conditions such as variable recharge or changes
in crop value and energy costs. This is because it derives pumping rates in real-time
based on currently observed hydraulic heads. The open loop and feedback Nash
strategies give results closer to the short-term myopic strategy when players have
asymmetric revenue functions or when a large number of players are sharing the
same aquifer.
Our analysis of the two Nash equilibrium strategies relies on closed form game
solutions that require all constraints to be affine equalities. This requirement can
be met to an acceptable degree of accuracy if pumping costs and aquifer geometry
maintain a large and reasonably constant aquifer flow depth (the difference between
the hydraulic head and the base elevation). When the inner aquifer depth decreases
significantly from its unpumped value the lateral flow coefficients in the compartmen-
tal equations can no longer be assumed to be constants and stock and flux limitations
expressed as inequality constraints may become active. In this case the affine state
equations need to be replaced by a combination of nonlinear equalities and linear in-
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equalities. The associated closed form Nash solution approach no longer applies and
the Nash equilibrium solutions must be found iteratively. Convergence and unique-
ness of these solutions can be difficult to prove. In our analysis of the low aquifer flow
depth case we consider only the social and myopic strategies, which bracket the open
and feedback Nash equilibrium strategies in terms of efficiency and pumping rate.
An analysis of these strategies for our example problem indicates that stock and flux
limitations can play an important role in determining the maximum water available
for pumping when the unit pump cost is too low to be limiting.
Taken together, these investigations provide valuable insight about player and
groundwater flow behavior over a range of decision strategies, hydrologic conditions,
and economic parameters. The optimization results presented here can support water
management policies by indicating when economic inefficiencies due to uncooperative
exploitation are significant and when they can probably be neglected. Of course, the
model and example considered here are still quite simplified compared to reality and
caution should be used in extrapolating our results, especially in support of policy
recommendations. A game analysis is most useful for framing the problem, suggesting
hypotheses, and indicating areas of uncertainty that require additional attention. In
these respects it provides a good way to gain better understanding of the factors
responsible for undesirable groundwater depletion.
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Chapter 4
Managing groundwater as a common
pool resource: A spatially distributed
approach
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 discusses the consequences of groundwater pumping under different man-
agement strategies using a spatially lumped aquifer model. This analysis improves
on studies that rely on a bucket model by using a multi-compartmental approach
that provides a more realistic treatment of boundary conditions, flow in the ab-
sence of pumping, and the effects of stock and river flux limitations. The approach
provides useful quantitative estimates of inefficiencies due to uncoooperative aquifer
exploitation. However, there are certain drawbacks to a spatially lumped analysis.
In particular, in a lumped model the players in a given compartment share the same
spatially averaged head, which depends only on the total pumping rate summed over
all players. In reality, heads vary significantly over space and the head at each player's
well might depend primarily on that player's own pumping rate and only secondarily
on the pumping rates of others. The influence of other players' pumping rates on a
given player's well drawdown and pumping cost depends strongly on the geometric
arrangement and proximity of the wells. When wells are sufficiently far apart the
impact of uncooperative management is small. When they are closer together the
impact can be greater ([14]). These important spatial effects are not considered in
a lumped groundwater model but can be included in a higher resolution spatially
distributed model.
Recent literature on the groundwater common pool problem has placed increased
emphasis on using more realistic physical models and/or descriptions of player be-
havior ([561,[501,[701,{57,[311). Some of this research tends to emphasize economic
aspects and uses simplified analytical solutions to describe groundwater flow. These
studies can account for the strategic externalities and economic inefficiencies that
arise during uncooperative exploitation of the resource but they generally cannot pro-
vide physically convincing descriptions of groundwater flow ([3],[63],156],[57]). Other
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research studies emphasize hydrologic aspects and use more realistic groundwater
models but are limited in their ability to account for the behavior of uncooperative
players who anticipate future consequences and respond to other players' actions in
real time. These studies typically focus on social optimum or myopic strategies or
rely on multi-agent system simulation (MASS) ([14],[50],1701).A few studies combine
realistic groundwater solutions based on superposition of individual well drawdown
solutions or aquifer response functions with optimization or game theoretic methods
suitable for particular decision strategies or problem formulations ([141,[461,[491). Our
objective in this chapter is to further bridge the gap between economically-focused
and hydrologically-focused approaches by incorporating a more general high resolu-
tion spatially distributed groundwater model into a convenient closed form approach
for solving uncooperative games.
The spatially distributed model used here is based on a space and time-discretized
(finite element) partial differential equation (PDE) description of unconfined ground-
water flow. This PDE system can accommodate heterogeneity in hydrogeological
parameters such as transmissivities and boundary conditions to provide a tool that
is able to represent the distinctive characteristics of particular aquifers and manage-
ment problems. We use the spatially distributed model to compare the performance
of three of the pumping strategies already considered in Chapter 3: Social optimum,
Feedback Nash Equilibrium, and myopic. The comparison is based on a simple hy-
pothetical example that clarifies the important role of the player well configuration
and of connections between groundwater sources and well locations.
4.2 Formulation of the spatially distributed ground-
water model
4.2.1 Objective and constraints
We formulate the spatially distributed common pool problem as an N-person finite
horizon non-cooperative discrete time deterministic game, following the notation of
Basar and Oldser [8]. The objective functional to be maximized by Player i is:
K-
L2(u,...,uN),-- -, ,Xk,Xk+l) gK(XK); i
k=1 (4.1)
K-1
S (1 +r)-k [B'(u') - Ci(Uixk)] - gK(XK)
k=1
where i is the control variable (water pumped, LT 1 ) for Player i over stage (time
step) k and u' is a vector of Player i's pumping rates for all K stages. For conve-
nience we suppose that each player operates a single well at a specified location. This
assumption can be readily generalized to allow for multiple wells for each player, if
desired. The discounted net benefit in each stage gi ($) is proportional to the dif-
ference between the current benefit B (ui) from using the pumped groundwater to
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grow crops and the current cost of pumping Cj(4, Xk), with a discount rate r. In
the spatially distributed formulation the pumping cost for a given player is propor-
tional to the local drawdown at that player's well location. This is in contrast to
the lumped formulation of Chapter 3, which computes player cost from a spatially
averaged compartmental head that is common to all players.
The state equation is derived from the following vertically-averaged unconfined
aquifer equation [70]:
ah(x, t)0 't V.r((h(x, t) - hB)Vh(x, t)) + q(x, t) (4.2)
where , is the aquifer hydraulic conductivity, hB is the elevation at the base of the
aquifer, q(x, t) is a forcing function that defines the pumping withdrawal distribution
over space and time, and 0 is the aquifer specific yield. This equation can be assumed
to be linear when the unconfined aquifer depth h(x, t) - hB is sufficiently large to
approximate r,(h(x, t) -hB) by a head-independent transmissivity T(x, t). We restrict
our attention to situations where this approximation is reasonable since it enables us
to use a convenient closed form solution for feedback Nash equilibrium management
strategy.
The initial head is specified over the domain Q at t = 0:
h = ho in Q t = 0 (4.3)
A mixed boundary condition is specified over the domain boundary T as follows:
Oh
n = a(H(x) - h(x, t)) + Q (4.4)
Where H is a prescribed time invariant head condition at specified locations along
the boundary such as a river or lake and Q is a specified constant flux.
We suppose here that the aquifer transmissivity is spatially uniform so the ground-
water flow state equation can be reduced to:
0  'h(x, t) TV 2 h(x, t)) + q(x, t) (4.5)
at
The transmissivity can be allowed to vary over space, if desired, without affecting the
basic problem formulation. Equation 4.5 can be solved using numerical techniques
that rely on a discrete spatial discretization grid such as the one illustratated in Figure
4-1. The finite element grid shown in the figure approximates the continuously varying
hydraulic head with a piecewise linear function that interpolates the head values at
a finite number of node points at the corners of the discrete grid cells (elements).
These nodal head values are the unknowns in the discretized finite element solution
procedure. If time is also discretized to be compatible with 4.1 the partial differential
equation is approximated by the following set of discrete difference equations:
hk 1 = Fkhk + Gu ..... + GNUN + Ek (4.6)
where the matrices Fk, G. are obtained from the time and space discretization of the
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The player benefit functions used in the spatially distributed problem formulation
have the samte quadratic structure used in the lumped model of Chapter 3:
Bi(u%) =binz + bi(ui)2  (4.7)
O <?4t< ut.= V icEN (4.8)
However, the pumping cost functions are different from the lumped model versions.
The cost for Player i depends on the depth to groundwater at that player's particular
well location. This can be described compactly as follows:
Cl(ui, hk) =cr/(hg - mihk)ut; c > 0 (4.9)
where hg is the specified ground surface elevation. The vector m, has a few non-zero
elements and the rest equal to 0. This selects out the component of the discretized
head vector at player i's well location. For simplicity we assume that the ground
surface elevation is constant (i.e. the same at all wells). With this formulation each
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player's pumping cost depends on the local drawdown at his/her pumping well. The
drawdown is no longer the same at all the pumping locations or for all players.
The objectives and state equation given above can be put in an affine quadratic
form that permits us to use closed form solutions for the social optimum, feedback
Nash equlibrium, and myopic decision strategies. All three of these strategies give
affine decision rules that depend on the current state of the system. The affine
quadratic objective function can be expressed as:
K-1
L2(u', ... ,uN) hKTQGhKhK + i %Tu ,i + k hkUk + S kuk (4.10)
k=1
hk+1 = Fkhk + G 4 +... + GNN + Ek (4.11)
and the state-dependent affine decision rule is:
Ui = 4i(xk) = Ihk + Ti (4.12)
Here the pumping decision is dependent not only on the local well head but also on
the heads at all the other nodes in the aquifer, including those pumped by other
players.
4.3 Results and discussion
With a spatially distributed formulation of the groundwater system, the questions of
strategic externality and non-cooperation examined in Chapter 3 can be re-visited.
In particular, in this section we address the following research questions:
" How does the aquifer head vary over time and space and what is the influence
of well geometry on the head distribution ?
* How much does the revenue efficiency decrease with an uncooperative pumping
strategy, as compared to a cooperative or social optimal strategy?
" How do the fluxes between water sources (boundaries) and sinks (wells) vary
over time and space and how do they depend on decision strategy and well
geometry?
Analysis of these topics depends on the specific properties and capabilities of the
physical systems model and on the objectives and decision strategies of the players.
As a nominal case, we examine the above questions in a small rectangular domain
(400km2 ) to observe local head drawdowns and fluxes. Figure 4-1 shows this domain,
which contains two pumping wells belonging to Players 1 and 2. It has a zero flux
boundary condition on the top and bottom edge boundaries. On the left boundary is
a constant prescribed flux Q. On the right boundary is a river modeled as a constant
head condition with spsecified head hR. Each of two identical players cultivates crops
on his/her half the of the domain. Table 4.1 summarizes the nominal values used for
the parameters.
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Parameter Symbol Representative value
Domain Area darea 400km 2
Domain length di 20km
Domain width dw 20km
Hydraulic conductivity K 1km/yr
Specific yield (unconfined) 0 0.1
Prescribed flux Q 0.2mkm 1 yr-1
River head hr Om above datum
Single stage time step At 1 yr
Number of state K 50 yr
Discount rate r 3%
Number of players N 2
Benefit function parameters bt, bt 0.1$m-'km-2, 3.2$m-2 km-4
Pumping cost parameter 77, C 50%, 0.15$kWhr 1
Table 4.1: Representative values for the parameters
4.3.1 The effect of well spatial configuration
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Figure 4-2: Flow and head behavior with two different well configurations. Left shows
a symmetric placement with respect to the boundaries while the right figure shows
an asymmetric placement
In this section we compare the flow behavior between the two well configurations
shown in Figure 4-2 . The left panel shows an symmetric configuration where the
pumps are located equidistant from the two boundaries. The two wells have equal
access to the constant recharge and the constant river head boundary. The right
panel shows an asymmetric well configuration with one well closer to the recharge
and the other closer to the river head boundary. In the absence of pumping wells,
the prescribed recharge flux for both configurations flows from the left to the right
boundary. Figure 4-3 shows the corresponding head contours and flow lines.
When the wells are pumped the groundwater system eventually reaches a new
steady state with the head generally lower than the initial unpumped solution. This
new steady-state depends on the decision strategy used to determine the pumping
56
Hydraulic head (m) and flow
18
1 (,j-
1-7-
4
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0 5 10 15 20
Figure 4-3: Hydraulic head condition and flow lines in the absence of pumping wells
rates. The steady-state groundwater flow distributions for the feedback Nash equi-
librium strategy are discussed below in a separate section for each well configuration.
Symmetric Configuration Results
Figure 4-4 shows the steady state head contours and flow directions for the symmet-
ric well configuration when pumping is based on an uncooperative feedback Nash
strategy. The head lines reveal local drawdown at the two pump locations near the
top (player 1) and bottom (player 2). The head gradients drive the water from the
flux boundaries into the wells. The pumps draw water from the specified head river
boundary on the right as well as from the specified flux boundary on the left. The
head contour curves and the flow lines are symmetrical since the players share the
same marginal benefit and cost functions and the well configuration is symmetrical.
Figure 4-5 shows the steady state pumped head profiles for the three candidate
decision strategies along a bottom to top (Y axis) section passing through both player
wells. Note that the the pumped steady-state heads are significantly lower than the
uniform unpumped steady-state head at this central location. Figure 4-6 shows the
head and pumping time histories for the three management strategies. For this com-
pletely symmetrical case the two players have identical head and pumping histories
and identical revenues and costs. With a local drawdown lower than the river head,
it is possible to sustain a steady-state pumping rate higher than the total recharge.
Asymmetric Configuration
Figure 4-7 shows the pumped steady state for an uncooperative feedback Nash equi-
librium strategy with the asymmetric well configuration. It is interesting to note that
in this case some of the groundwater entering from the left boundary flows past the
wells to the right boundary. The well closer to the left boundary (Player 1) obtains
57
Hydraulic head and flow lines: FBNE
-0
26- - - - - - 10
2
-1
01
0 5 10 15 20
x- direction (kin)
Figure 4-4: Contour plot and flow lines for a symmetric pump geometry using a
feedback Nash equilibrium strategy
all of its water from the recharge. The well on the right (Player 2) draws in water
from both the recharge and the river head boundaries.
For the nominal pumping cost, the Player 1 pumping rate cannot exceed the total
flux available from the left boundary. To obtain additional water from the river Player
1 needs to generate a much higher local drawdown than the drawdown at the Player
2 well. This is an expensive strategy that would drive up the Player 1 pumping cost.
Figures 4-8 and 4-9 illustrates this point with steady-state head profiles along a
left to right (x axis) section through the two wells as well as plots -of the total pumping
history (sum for the two players). At the pumped steady-state, the social optimum
and feedback Nash equilibrium strategy give a higher head in the left well than the
right. By contrast, the myopic strategy gives a somewhat greater drawdown at Well
1. The pumping rate starts from a high value with lower pumping costs and gradually
decreases as the local drawdown increases. This is observed in all the three decision
rules, with the social optimum giving the lowest steady-state pumping and drawdown
and the myopic giving the highest. Figure 4-8 shows that the total pumping rate is
greater than the recharge, reflecting the contribution from the river.
Figure 4-9 distinguishes the pumping rates between the two players. The well
closer access to the river boundary pumps more than the total recharge (Qd" =
0.04km 3yr 1 ) and obtains most of its water from the river. The player closer to the
flux boundary is restricted to a lower steady state pump rate due to lack of river
access.
4.3.2 Revenue efficiency for alternative decision strategies
The inefficiency incurred by the feedback Nash equilibrium and myopic strategies can
be measured in terms of the percentage of revenue lost, as compared to the social
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Figure 4-5: Left panel compares the aquifer head profile at steady state along the
y direction at x = 10km between social optimum, feedback Nash equilibrium and
myopic strategies. Right panel shows the their total pumping histories.
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Figure 4-6: Individual player pump rates with asymmetric well configuration under
three decision strategies. With equal net benefit functions, players show the same
pumping behavior
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feedback Nash equilibrium strategy
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Figure 4-8: Left panel compares the aquifer head profile at steady state along the
x direction at y = 10km between social optimum, feedback Nash equilibrium and
myopic strategies. Right panel shows the total pumping histories.
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Figure 4-9: Individual player pump rates with an asymmetric well configuration under
three decision strategies. Left panel shows pump rate of the well closer to the river
boundary condition while the right panel shows the pump history of the well closer
to the flux boundary.
optimum strategy. Table 4.2 summarizes the revenue and steady state pumping rates
for the three strategies for the symmetric and asymmetric well configurations. The
feedback Nash equilibrium and the myopic strategies are, as expected, more aggressive
than the social optimum in drawing down the groundwater stock.
The spatially distributed model provides the capability to examine the effect of the
geometric configuration in the player wells and reveals important asymmetries that
are missed in a spatially lumped analysis of the groundwater common pool problem.
Although the players in this example have the same benefit and cost functions, their
total revenues differ for all decision strategies. The difference in their well locations
creates about 16% change in the revenue generated. A lumped model fails to distin-
guish these two cases since it only considers the spatially averaged aquifer head in
the pumping region.
4.3.3 Asymmetrical player benefits
The benefit function of the players in the nominal case generates 50000$km-2yr-1
using about 800mmyr-' of water. We now consider a case where one of the players
grows a crop that can generate 20% more revenue per unit area than the nominal case.
The other player grows the nominal crop. The spatial configuration is the symmetrical
arrangement considered earlier. Figure 4-10 shows the head contour curves and the
flow lines at the steady state using a feedback Nash equilibrium strategy. The lower
well is operated by the player with the higher value crop. This player pumps more
and has a higher local drawdown than the player with the lower value crop. Figure
4-11 shows the variation of hydraulic head along the y-direction at x = 10km while
Figure 4-12 shows the pumping histories of the individual players. The steady-state
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Pump rate: player close to river Pump rate: player closer to flux boundary/
Revenue (NPV) (x10 6 $) Steady state pump rate (km 3 yr 1 )Case Social FBNE Myopic Social FBNE Myopic
Symmetric 100.73 98.52 91.93 0.0732 0.0800 0.0933
location 2.2% 8.7% 9.3% 27.5%
Asymmetric 846 82.7 76.7 0.067 0.074 0.087
location 2.5% 10% 10.4% 29.8%
Symmetric location 129.01 122.03 0.0817 0.0888 0.1029
Asymmetric benefits 1 2.4% 7.7% 8.7% 26%
Table 4.2: Performance assessment of non-optimal management of the groundwater
system w.r.t social optimum with a spatially distributed system. Percent values
indicate relative difference to the social optimum.
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Figure 4-10: Contour plot and flow lines for a symmetric pump geometry but with
asymmetry in the net benefit function using a feedback Nash equilibrium strategy
pumping rate for the player with the higher value crop is 20% higher. Table 4.2
quantifies the revenue inefficiency and pumpage increase of the non-cooperative and
myopic strategies with respect to social optimum.
Overall, Table 4.2 indicates that the inefficiencies associated with a myopic strat-
egy are greater than those obtained with an uncooperative Nash equilibrium that
considers the future impacts of pumping. The inefficiency resulting from adoption of
an uncooperative Nash strategy rather than a social optimum strategy is minor. Our
spatially distributed analysis suggests that the local impacts of depletion at a player's
well moderate pumping behavior sufficiently to diminish the adverse impacts of non-
cooperative behavior, especially when future consequences are taken into account.
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Figure 4-11: Left panel compares the aquifer head profile at steady state along the
y direction at x = 10km between social optimum, feedback Nash equilibrium and
myopic strategies for asymmetric players. At y = 6km the pump with the higher
marginal benefit has greater drawdown than the other pumping location. Right panel
shows the total pumping histories.
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pump rates with an asymmetric well configuration
Left panel shows pump rate of the well closer to the
the right panel shows the pump history of the well
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4.4 Conclusions
This chapter extends our discussion of the common pool groundwater depletion prob-
lem by considering local spatial effects not included in the lumped analysis of Chapter
3. The spatially distributed description of groundwater flow used in this chapter pro-
vides a more realistic way to examine interactions between different players exploiting
a common groundwater resource. With this description players decide on pumping
rates based on local rather than spatially averaged well drawdowns. With suitable
assumptions, spatially distributed groundwater dynamics can be reduced to set of
affine state equations that adequately capture fine scale interactions between indi-
vidual wells and between wells and sources of groundwater. When combined with a
quadratic objective this affine formulation makes it possible to compute convenient
closed form solutions for both uncooperative and cooperative aquifer management
strategies and to readily evaluate the magnitude of economic inefficiencies resulting
from excessive depletion.
The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and myopic strategies both perform some-
what worse than the social optimum in terms of revenue generated, although the
magnitude of the inefficiency is not large (about 2 - 10%). Our analysis shows that
apart from the choice of the decision strategy, factors such as the the placement of
pumping wells and their proximity to boundary sources play important roles in pump-
ing behavior. Asymmetric pumping behavior between the players can arise in at least
two ways - first, when players have different marginal benefit and cost functions
and, second, when players have unequal access to water (even if they have symmetric
objectives). Players with easier access to water tend to pump more than those who
do not. A lumped model approach fails to capture the unequal access effect. The spa-
tially distributed approach outlined here extends the scope of game-oriented research
to capture key hydrologic features that have not been widely considered in the past.
Consideration of these effects helps to identify how different problem specifications
can influence the impact of uncooperative behavior on economic efficiency.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and scope for future work
This research presents novel approaches for better assessment in dynamic manage-
ment of water resources. Using techniques from numerical programming and optimal
control theory, two cases of water resources management are studied. The first is a
hydropower reservoir operations problem and the second is a groundwater common
pool resource problem. The underlying feature in these two cases is the dynamics of
real-time decision making, either by the hydropower reservoir operator or the farmers
sharing the aquifer. Making decisions dynamically gives one an ability to adapt to
different external forcing such as uncertainty in the climate conditions or multiple
agents competitively utilizing the water for their personal objective.
In the case of single agent hydropower operations problem, a coupled framework of
fixing optimum contract and computing optimal real-time decision rule is developed.
By using an ensemble based stochastic optimization approach, a decision-maker can
obtain a probabilistic performance measure of their optimal contract across multiple
objectives and across different predictive or non-predictive strategies before the op-
erations begin. In addition, s/he can generate real-time revenue behavior and release
decisions computed over different random future scenarios that carry the uncertainty
information with different operational strategies. This conceptual framework is a
useful tool to combine financial risk uncertainty to reservoir operational strategy.
A possible direction to extend the scope of such coupled analysis is to incorporate
random energy pricing in a multi-supplier and multi-buyer energy framework.
The work on the groundwater common pool resource problem improves upon the
current understanding of the nature of groundwater sharing/ competition. With
the timescales associated with groundwater flow and development in the agriculture
sector, we observe that a transient analysis is necessary when modeling groundwater
depletion. However, we find that there is marginal revenue difference (- 5%) between
non-cooperative strategies and the social optimum when applied across two different
mathematical abstractions of the groundwater flow. The lumped model description,
which uses a spatially averaged head to depict depletion is a lower-dimensional model
than the spatially distributed approach. Although the two models give similar values
of revenue efficiency, the difference lies in their depiction of flow behavior and water
balance across the different source (river, recharge) and sink terms (pumping wells).
The spatially distributed model shows local drawdowns at well locations and demotes
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the exacerbated effect of strategic externality as observed in a lumped model. This
is because, for a player to obtain groundwater access from distant regions, requires
high local drawdown which increases his/ her pumping cost. Hence the estimate
of strategic exernality or competition is dependent of various factors such a well
configuration, local hydrology and objective criteria. The framework described in the
study is flexible to capture different scenarios for a better assessment of groundwater
management. A natural extension of this work, is to incorporate a player's choice to
pump more wells and increase the cultivated area. This addition better signifies the
development of mechanization in agriculture and large scale farms from subsidence
level small scale farms. Also, the current analysis assumes a perfect knowledge of
various parameters used in the system including the hydrology. However this is often
not true. A stochastic treatment to the spatially distributed model may provide a
better picture of expected utility from a shared aquifer system.
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Appendix A
Hydropower optimization model: non
dimensional form
Specifying the equivalent objective function, state equations ans inequality constraints
with the non-dimensional variables
K-1
E{ (1 + r)-k[g'[E4, E'] - a'zZ'] + gl} (A.1)
k=O
g'(E , E) - a(E - E') + E' if E < E' (A.2)
g'(E', E') a2 (E' - E') E' if E > E'
k = log(I ) (A.3)
Ok+ = f2(Xk,Uk,Wk) P k + Wk (A.4)
1
I+ =- - Z / (A.5)
Tres
1
= Sk-+ [ex p pbe k + wk - uk]- Zk
Tres
1
Z = max{S + -[I - u'] - 1, 0} (A.6)
Tres
1E~ ~ = $'ukhkhk+1 = mx maxU'k7hmaxh'k Ihmaxh'k+1) ( A.
h H'(Sk)= H(SmaxS ) (A.8)
Uk - max for k=O:K-1 (A.9)
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Appendix B
Groundwater Lumped model
appendix
B.1 Definition of objective function and constraint
matrices for the two-compartment dynamic game
problem
Each agent i wants to maximize their objective Li subject to the state equation
implemented as an equality constraint
K-1
Li = x TQxx,KX K +  -k [UiTQUUk + 2xTQx,kt4 + 2Sk (B.1)
Vi E N, (k = 1,x 1 is given (B.2)
N
Xk+1 Fkxk + Gu + E (B.3)
where Xk [hok, hlk]T is the aquifer head in the outer and the inner aquifer;
Ap1 At Ap 1JAt 1
F = A 0 6 (B.4)
LA 10 A 1 0
F01
G = At (B.5)
AiO
Ek = AI (B.6)
AG .
b Q = [0 0.5cq]; S =b - 0.5crh9 , Vi c N (B.7)
The present analysis assumes the parameter based matrices, [F, G', E, Qu, Qx, S] , Vi E
N to be constant in time but can easily be generalized to a time varying behavior
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B.2 Social optimum decision strategy
In this strategy a single player decides the pumping rate for the all the wells. Therefore
the single agent has a 2-state N-control dynamic problem to solve. The N objectives
from the agents are augmented together to give a modified linear quadratic objective
Li and a modified affine state equation as an equality constraint.
K-1
L xiQXXKxK + (1 + r)k uT QuUk + 2xk Quxuk + 2SuUk](B.8)
k=1
subject to (B.9)
Xk+1 = Fxk + GUk + Ek; k = 1; x1 is given (B.10)
where
N
Qxx,K = Qxx,K
i= 1
QUU :diagonal N x N matrix with Q' as diagonal elements[Q , Ql , , Q , Q ; 2 x N matrix
SU = [ SU1, 2Si S, S N] ; I x N matrix
G = [G 1 , G2, G,, GN]; 2 x N matrix
The above equations transform to a linear quadratic control problem with affine
constraint. This can be solved using dynamic programming that recursively solves
from the final time step and generates a decision strategy for each time step. Due the
special structure of this problem, the decision strategy also holds an affine structure.
From the final time step,
VK-1 = maxuK- 1 Q uK-1 + 2xK 1 Q9uxuK-1 + 2 SuUK-1 + xKQxx,KxFB.11)
UK-1
Qxx,K = (1 +- 1 Qxx,K (B.12)
Substituting, XK = FxK-1 + GUK-1 + E and applying the first order condition w.r.t
to UK-1-
&VK-1
= 0 = QuuK-1 + QTxK-1 + Su + GTQxx,K(FxK + GUK + EF)
OUK-1 
KFK+G +E
USO,K-1 - (Quu + GT Qxx,KG) ((QT + GT Qxx,KF)xK + GTQxxKE)
USO,K-1 -Y),K-1(XK--1) O,KxK-1 + SO,K-1
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As mentioned the UK-1 takes an affine structure with respect to XK-1. This
process is repeated backwards in time from k = K - 1 to k = 1. The value function
VK-1 always obtained by substituting 7SO,K_1(XK-1)
VK1xK) x -1PK -1XK1 + 2 LK-1xK-1 + EK-1
Therefore at any stage k,
xPxkX+2Lkxk = max uTQuuk+2xTQuxuk+2SuUk(1+r )- (XT+ Pk+1xk+1- 2Lk+lxk+1)
(B.13)
"'SO,k = -(Qu + G+Pxx,k+l + GPxxk+1F)xk + GT Pxx,k+lE + Lk+1G)
PK Qxx,K, LK =0, O]T
Pk and Lk are recursively generated by substituting 7(SO, k) in B.13.
B.3 Open loop Nash equilibrium strategy
In an open loop strategy, the players commit to (uncooperatively) to best personal
interest from the initial stage (k = 1) based on the perfect information of the initial
state. Therefore, we need to compute a Nash equilibrium strategy with the entire
present value of the net benefit function for each agent. To compute this equilibrium,
the dynamic problem is converted to an equivalent static problem for each agent. The
objective function of each agent i can be written as
Li = XX -+ UiQ - 2XT Q u (B.14)
subject to
N
X = FX1 + _G + E (B.15)
where X, X 1 , Ui are augmented vectors
X [xI|...Ixa]T  (B.16)
X1= [xTI...xIT] T (B.17)
Similarly the matrices F.02 ,E ,Q'Q S_, , are appropriately generated using the
state equation 3.4 ([71). With these definitions the open loop problem can be solved
as a static game problem.
Substituting equation B.15 in B.14 and applying the first order condition om Li
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respect to u gives a set of N coupled linear matrix equations in u .
L,=0 - _FX1 + G u +E) +2Qui
+2 G!Tx! + x (EX,+Gu + ZGju +E (B.18)
+S, Vi E N
u = P( _iTQ F+Qi)(X1+ Gu)
+P E +Q E+ (B.19)
where P= - G TQ G + Qu + 0"QiG)
Solving this system of equations gives an affine solution for ui
i U i (B.20)[UL,1- UL,K-1 L(X) = 1 LX1 + VOBL
The solution is K - 1 length vector that is derived only from the initial state x1
B.4 Closed loop/ Feedback Nash equilibrium deci-
sion strategy (FBNE)
In this strategy, at each stage the players maximize their future benefits for any pos-
sible state of the system to satisfy the condition of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Unlike the open-loop solution that generates an action strategy at the initial stage,
the feedback NE generates a decision rule for each player at each stage of the game.
It is obtained by dynamic programming that recursively solves a set of N-coupled
matrix linear equations. Starting from the stage K - 1, Vi E N
Vi,K-1 = MaXU i Qu_ 1 + 2Suu _ 1 + TQxxXK, Vi E N (B.21)
UK-1
subject to equation B.3 (State equation)
Similar to the social optimum, the value function V,K-1 is maximized with respect
to the control Ui,K-1 (by applying the first order conditions). This generated a system
of linear set of equations with respect to Ui,K-1
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OK- 0 1 + xK-1 + SUK-1
GTX ,K (FXK + G u'K_ 1 + E GjuK 1 + E
Kl _1 = YBK-l((QxT + G Q x + F)xK + GTQ-xK S G JK_ B.22)
+G T xKE + Su) (B.23)
where YFB,K-1 -(Q'u + G iQ G
Solving the N set coupled linear equations with respect to uk_ 1 gives an affine
decision rule.
UFB,K_1 = 'YFB,1(XK-1) FB,K-1XK-1 + TB,K-1 (B.24)
Substituting the optimal strategy at stage K - 1 in equation B.4 yields a quadratic
value function Vk_ 1, Vi E N
XKaP1XK-1 + 2L - 1xK-1 + E1 (B.25)
Repeating this recursively generates a subgame perfect equilibrium solution at each
time step. At any stage k,
X Pixk + 2Lxk - max uT Q u + 2x iQ'xu' + 2Susk
U k (B.26)
(1 + ) +P+1Xk++ 2L'+xk+1)
UFB,k = FB,k (Xk) = ]',kxk + tB,k (B.27)
B.5 Myopic Strategy
Under a myopic strategy a player maximizes current net benefits only, without regard
for future benefits or the strategic externality of other players. This is easily computed
each stage by equating the current marginal revenue to the marginal cost. For each
player i E N
V,k(xk) - max u Q UU + 2xkQ zuX + 2Slu (B.28)maxtk uJ~ k k  k
(9Vi k
= 0 = QU + Qxx + Si (B.29)
Dui,k
-Q Q x(Q  +STi) (B.30)
uMYk =YMYk(Xk) - zykxk + T yk (B.31)
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Appendix C
Spatially distributed groundwater
system
The coefficient matrix in equation 4.6 are obtained from finite element based dis-
cretization scheme. For a standard elliptic equation:
Oh
d- _ V - (c - Vh) = f (C.-1)at
This equation holds in constrained domain Q. The boundary conditions can be of the
form Neumann boundary (flux-boundary) or a Dirchlet boundary (Head-boundary)
condition.
Dirchlet: ah r, on the boundary OQ (C.2)
Neumann: -n (V - h) + qh = g on 9Q (C.3)
7 is the outward unit normal. g, q, a, r are functions defined on &Q.
Assume that h is a solution of the PDE system. Multiply the entire equation by
v is an arbitrary test function and intergrte over the domain Q. For a steady state
analysis d = 0,
-(V - c -h)v dx jfv dx (C.4)
Integrate by parts (using Green's formula) to obtain:
j((cVh) - Vv)dx - j -' (cV - h)v ds = fv dx (C.5)
Adding the boundary condition to replace the integral at the boundary
j((cVh) -Vv)dx - (-qh + g)v ds = j fv dx (C.6)
By projecting the solution u and v that belong to an function space V, the above
equation projected unto a finite dimensional subspace VN, C V. As the differential
75
operator is linear, the variational equation must solve must satisy
# C VNp -
j((cVh) -Vphij - f Oj)dx - (-qh + g)ji ds =
Expressing the solution h in the same basis of VNP
Np test functions
0, for i= 1, 2.., N (C.7)
(C.8)h(x) = EHj5,(x)
j=1
Np
((cV5) -V$idx + j q5 ds)U= f idx +
j=1 2 a
(K + M + Q)H = F + G
where
gqi ds, f or i = 1, .. , Np (C.9)
(C.10)
stiffness matrix: (cV#j) - Voidx
mass matrix : integral of d coefficient against basis function
integral of q coefficient against basis function
integral of f coefficient against basis function
These coefficient matrices are then used to construct the corresponding low-
dimensional spatially distributed system dynamical system.
M(Hk+l - Hk) + O.5K(Hk+l + Hk) = FriverHr + Ff luxR +
(M + 0.5K) Hk+1 = (M - 0.5K) Hk + FriverHr + FflxR +
N
FpumpiQi
FpuMPAQ
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K
M
Q:
F:
(C.11)
(C.12)
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